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Dear Fellow Americans:
The National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP) is issuing the final report of its 
recommendations at a particularly critical time. The President and Congress have each 
publicly committed themselves not only to strengthening the Social Security program, but 
also to increasing retirement income for all Americans in the twenty-first century. Improved 
revenue projections for the federal budget provide a unique opportunity to set aside the 
necessary funds to ensure that future benefit promises are met. The question before us is 
whether there exists a true spirit of bipartisan cooperation and compromise needed to 
complete the job.
The attached report can serve as a road map for such reform. We commend this proposal to 
you not only for the policy goals it achieves, but also for the spirit of compromise it embodies. 
Our Commission included 24 experts on retirement policy from both the public and private 
sectors. These experts brought with them very diverse approaches to addressing the issue of 
retirement income security. After 15 months of work, last May the Commission voted 
unanimously to report the enclosed recommendations. Our success came about not because 
24 members, or even one member, felt persuaded that every element of our proposal was the 
best one. It was, rather, that each of the 24 members of the Commission worked together in 
the spirit of cooperation and compromise to develop this plan.
Similar cooperation will be necessary if Congress and the president are to make the necessary 
choices to expand and solidify all sources of retirement income in the twenty-first century. 
We hope that, like the members of our Commission, members of Congress, and the 
administration will follow the model of compromise established by the NCRP and eschew 
rigid perspectives toward policy in the interest of completing this most important task—
enhancing the retirement security for all Americans.
Naturally, any cooperative agreement on a comprehensive proposal to strengthen retirement 
security will require trade-offs and tough choices. Our proposal is no different. Although you 
may not agree with every part of this plan, we ask that you consider it in its entirety, including 
all it achieves, before making a judgment. Moreover, we encourage you to ask, “What other 
plan achieves as much?”
As the cochairs of the NCRP, we remain committed to advancing the ideas put forward in this 
proposal, and to continuing the effort to implement policies that will increase the retirement 
income available to Americans in the twenty-first century and beyond.
Sincerely,
Judd Gregg John Breaux
United States Senate United States Senate
Jim Kolbe Charles W. Stenholm
U.S. House of Representatives U.S. House of Representatives
Donald B. Marron Dr. Charles A. Sanders
Chairman and CEO, Paine Webber Group, Inc. Retired Chairman and CEO, Glaxo, Inc.
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question, however, CSIS’s National Commission on Retirement Policy has 
performed a great public service by demonstrating there is a bipartisan solution 
that strengthens the Social Security system and enhances retirement security for all 
Americans.
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1Executive Summary
Introduction
Laying the foundation for economic growth and prosperity in the face of the 
profound demographic changes that will occur early in the next century is perhaps 
the most difficult challenge facing the United States. The imminent retirement of 
the “baby boom” generation, combined with longer life expectancies, will place 
extraordinary pressures on the economic resources necessary to sustain the rising 
standard of living that Americans have come to expect—and potentially fray the 
vital threads of the safety net programs the government provides for senior 
citizens.
Quite simply, we—as a country and as individuals—are ill-prepared to meet 
the financial challenges of the twenty-first century. We are confronted with a 
rapidly aging population, actuarially unsound federal health and retirement 
programs, unsustainable trends of spending for government programs for senior 
citizens, and inadequate levels of private savings. We have promised too much 
collectively and set aside too little individually. As a result, the proverbial “three-
legged stool” of resources for retirement security—Social Security, private pension 
plans, and personal savings—that traditionally has financed Americans’ retirement 
is increasingly unstable and in need of repair.
Last year, the National Commission on Retirement Policy (NCRP) published 
Can America Afford to Retire? a document that illustrates the inexorable 
demographic trends, enormous fiscal pressures, and insufficient personal savings 
that threaten future standards of living of aging Americans. The following findings 
warrant the attention and action of policymakers.
America Is Growing Older
Today, one in eight Americans is aged 65 or older. As the first wave of the baby 
boom generation will begin to retire after 2010 (early retirement for Social 
Security benefits would be 2008), however, the share of older Americans will 
increase significantly. By 2040, nearly one in four will be 65 or older. At the same 
time, life expectancy will continue to rise. On average, Americans are living 14 
years longer than when Social Security was created, and the trend toward longer 
lifespans will continue. These demographic changes will place tremendous fiscal 
pressure on federal retirement and health programs for the elderly. Furthermore, a 
“baby bust” succeeded the baby boom—meaning that there will be fewer workers 
to help finance each retiree’s benefits in the future.
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We Have Promised Too Much
Federal entitlement programs—under which money is spent automatically on a 
category of recipients who meet government-specified qualifications—consume an 
ever-increasing share of our country’s financial resources. Spending on 
entitlements (principally federal health and retirement programs) has more than 
doubled since 1963 and now accounts for almost half of federal outlays. By the 
government’s own estimates, at the current rate of federal spending entitlements 
could absorb all government revenues by 2030.
We Are Saving Too Little
As a country and as individuals, we are not saving enough to meet future 
consumption needs. The rate of personal savings has declined steadily over the 
past few decades and now is approaching historic lows—insufficient to meet the 
future retirement needs of most Americans. Although recent gains in financial 
markets have buoyed a sense of wealth in many Americans, current annual 
individual savings rates are near zero. In fact, Americans, as a whole, actually had 
negative savings rates (as a percentage of disposable income) for the months 
September and October 1998, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the 
first negative monthly national savings rates since the agency began keeping such 
statistics more than 40 years ago.1 Low savings not only threatens the ability of 
individuals to retire with financial security, it also reduces the pool of capital 
available for investment, the pool that creates jobs and economic growth—all 
essential elements of higher standards of living for all Americans.
These Trends Are Unsustainable
Without significant public policy and social responses to the impending 
challenges, the standard of living for retirees after the first quarter of the twenty-
first century could decline. Society simply will be unable to afford all the promises 
we have made absent change. A failure to act boldly with structural reforms now 
will raise future costs dramatically and require added sacrifices 10 to 20 years 
down the road. All policymakers who have examined the issue recognize both the 
need for action and the benefits of acting sooner rather than later.
The Social Safety Net
Presently, inflows to the Social Security system exceed benefits paid out. The 
program’s Trust Fund will begin to pay out more in benefits than it collects in 
payroll taxes soon after the baby boomers begin retiring, however, and will run 
even larger annual operating deficits thereafter. According to the Social Security 
trustees, if no action is taken in the interim, the Trust Fund will be entirely depleted 
1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income and 
Outlays,” BEA News Release, October 1998.
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by 2032. Because of these trends, polls show young people are losing faith in the 
system.
Private Retirement Plans
Currently, fewer than half of all workers are enrolled in an employer-sponsored 
pension plan. The problem is even more acute for those working in small 
businesses. As of 1993, 84 percent of workers in companies employing more than 
1,000 people had access to a retirement plan, but only 17 percent of workers in 
companies with 25 or fewer employees had a retirement plan available to them at 
work. As a result, only about 20 percent of Americans in businesses with 100 or 
fewer employees participate in a retirement plan. The problem is worse for women 
and minorities who tend to have shorter job tenures and who are more likely to be 
part-time employees without coverage by an employer-sponsored plan. Moreover, 
current pension rules allow for excessive leakage and can be overly complex and 
burdensome.
Personal Savings
As they do now, retirees will have to supplement Social Security payments with 
personal savings. Financial experts tell us, however, that current levels of personal 
retirement savings are not nearly adequate to ensure financial independence for 
most Americans when they retire—even with pension and Social Security 
payments. The rate of personal savings fell from almost 12 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1965 to about 5 percent of GDP in 1995 and has 
continued to decline. According to one study by Merrill Lynch, the oldest baby 
boomers are saving just one-third of what they will need to maintain their current 
standard of living during retirement. The fact is that most American families have 
very little set aside to meet future retirement expenses.
Addressing the Challenge
Because we have over-promised when it comes to the future benefits of the Social 
Security system, the level of Social Security benefits for future retirees will come 
under increased scrutiny. This is evidenced by the attention Social Security has 
received from President Bill Clinton, leaders in Congress, think tanks, academics, 
and the media.
Increasingly, Americans are arriving at the realization that Social Security 
alone will not assure a secure retirement, and that reliance on the limited resources 
of the federal government brings with it an increasing degree of risk. Individuals 
will have to assume greater personal responsibility for their own retirement 
security. The responsibility of Congress and the administration, therefore, not only 
is to restore Social Security’s actuarial solvency, but also to develop a 
comprehensive and integrated approach to retirement security by strengthening all 
areas of retirement savings. This not only will help to ensure an adequate standard 
of living for future generations of retirees, but will also foster continued economic 
growth and prosperity for the country.
4 The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
The National Commission on Retirement Policy
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established the 
bipartisan National Commission on Retirement Policy (the “Commission”) at the 
beginning of 1997 to highlight the looming retirement security challenge and 
recommend comprehensive and politically viable solutions to meet it. The 24-
member Commission is composed of respected and knowledgeable leaders from 
both the public and private sectors.
In its mission statement, the Commission outlined three primary objectives:
 to educate the American public about the scope and magnitude of the 
retirement financing challenge;
 to provide the foundation for nonpartisan and informed policy debate; and
 to build a national consensus for the changes necessary to place the country 
on a sound, long-term fiscal footing and ensure a secure retirement for all 
Americans.
The Commission also established three guiding principles in the beginning of 
its deliberative process:
 National retirement policy should be designed to enable Americans to enjoy 
a reasonable standard of living in their retirement years. National retirement 
policy should encompass government programs that require a floor of 
financial support for elderly retirees and initiatives that encourage and 
facilitate group (that is, employer) and individual savings to provide 
additional retirement income above the floor of support;
 National retirement policy should contribute to long-term growth and 
economic prosperity; and
 Government programs for elderly retirees should be financially sound and 
economically sustainable. The costs of financing these programs and other 
initiatives that encourage and facilitate national saving should be borne 
equitably between and among generations.
During the course of the subsequent 15 months, the Commission held several 
public meetings and fact-finding hearings and met with a wide range of interested 
constituencies, including business, labor, and seniors groups as part of an 
aggressive information gathering and outreach effort.
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
The result of the Commission’s 18-month deliberative effort is the 21st Century 
Retirement Security Plan. The Plan is unique in its bipartisan, comprehensive 
approach to retirement security, which encompasses improvements and reforms to 
all three principal sources of retirement savings: Social Security, private pensions, 
and personal savings. The interdependence of these areas cannot be ignored. The 
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more Americans save and invest through private pensions and personal savings, the 
more capital will be available to fuel growth and to provide the government with 
more options to ensure the stability of the Social Security system.
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan meets the goals established by the 
NCRP for Social Security. The Plan would:
 restore the long-term solvency of Social Security (OASDI);
 provide the traditional OASDI program with a stable Trust Fund at the end 
of the actuarial valuation period, so that the passage of time will not affect 
adversely measures of solvency;
 increase the retirement income provided through Social Security relative to 
traditional means of restoring the program to solvency;
 reduce significantly long-term debt and liabilities of the federal government 
to Social Security;
 enable Social Security to lift more of the elderly out of poverty than current 
law does;
 add incentives for individuals to remain in the workforce longer, thereby 
improving worker-to-beneficiary ratios;
 create individual savings accounts within Social Security that provide 
individuals with ownership and control over the investment of a portion of 
their Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes;
Key Elements of the 21st Century Retirement Plan
• Directs 2 percent of the current payroll tax into individual security accounts 
(ISAs) modeled on the Thrift Savings Plan;
• Allows for additional voluntary contributions to the ISA up to $2,000;
• Provides different investment alternatives;
• Strengthens the safety net by creating additional antipoverty protections 
within the traditional Social Security system;
• Gradually raises the eligibility age for full retirement benefits;
• Establishes a universal salary reduction–qualified retirement plan available 
to all employers;
• Moves to a universal income limit for IRAs;
• Makes it possible for workers to move retirement benefits among 
employer-sponsored plans;
• Creates catch-up provisions for individuals who have been without a 
pension plan for five years or longer;
• Provides cost-effective defined-benefit alternatives for small employers; 
and
• Reduces the time it takes for employers’ matching contributions to vest.
6 The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
 enhance opportunities for providing retirement security through private 
pension plans and personal savings; and
 accomplish all the above objectives without a tax increase and without 
placing an additional mandatory savings requirement on employers or 
employees.
Social Security Reforms
The NCRP Plan would modernize the Social Security system to allow individuals 
more personal choice and greater growth potential for their funds through the 
creation of individual security accounts (ISAs), funded by payroll tax 
contributions. The Plan also would keep Social Security solvent for the next 70 
years without tax increases; improve benefits for lower-income workers and 
establish higher minimum benefit levels to help the most vulnerable in our society; 
and encourage seniors to continue working by allowing them to keep their earnings 
without offsetting their Social Security benefits. Under the NCRP’s Plan, a single 
person retiring at age 65 could reasonably expect to receive in the year 2030 an 
increase of nearly 10 percent in his or her retirement income as compared with 
traditional approaches to achieving solvency (such as raising payroll taxes or 
cutting benefits). An individual retiring at age 67 in 2060, in fact, could expect a 
38.4 percent increase.
Private Pension Plans and Personal Retirement Savings 
Reforms
The private pension and personal retirement savings legs of the NCRP’s Plan are 
designed to complement the changes to Social Security. The Commission outlined 
changes in tax laws that would help more Americans to obtain private pension 
coverage. The NCRP’s Plan would reduce pension regulation and allow workers to 
retain their pension assets more easily when they changed jobs. The Plan also 
would increase personal retirement savings by expanding and simplifying 
individual retirement accounts (IRAs), making tax-advantaged IRAs available to 
all Americans.
A key element of the Commission’s Plan—and potentially the most politically 
difficult to enact—is a revised Social Security system. The compelling need for 
reform of this vital program identified by the Commission dictates the need for 
legislative action. It is precisely because of the nearly “sacrosanct” status of Social 
Security, however, that politicians have proceeded so cautiously down the reform 
path for fear of alienating voters—nearly all of whom have a vested interest in the 
program. Both Republicans and Democrats are leery of embarking unilaterally on 
reform measures for fear that their efforts will be used against them in the next 
election cycle.
Those who, for policy or political reasons, oppose fundamental Social Security 
reform legislation have an inherent advantage; a system in place is difficult to alter. 
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This is especially true if that system is viewed as a success. The politics of fear and 
labels of “radical” change can be exploited easily to place roadblocks in the way of 
reform. But it is precisely because Social Security is so important to Americans 
that efforts to save the system from insolvency should transcend party politics.
Leadership and statesmanship are the prerequisites for the ultimate success of 
any such effort. The Commission’s Plan can serve as a framework for 
policymakers by demonstrating that bipartisan consensus for comprehensive 
detailed reform, not simply agreement on basic concepts, is possible when carried 
out in a deliberative, objective fashion.
8The 21st Century Retirement 
Security Plan
Introduction
As the United States and its approximately 270 million citizens prepare for the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, we confront one of our greatest challenges as 
a country. The imminent retirement of the baby boom generation soon after the 
turn of the century will strain the fiscal capacity of the United States to ensure an 
adequate standard of living for those Americans moving into their golden years. 
Like other challenges our country has met, we will overcome this one too. 
Willpower alone will not be enough, however. This challenge will require 
Americans to reevaluate the financial partnership of government, employers, and 
individuals in providing retirement income for all citizens. It will take overt action 
by individuals and policymakers to recognize the issues we face and change our 
behavior and policies to prepare for the challenge. The initial step toward meeting 
the challenge successfully is acknowledging the situation. The first section of this 
report describes this looming problem.
Retirement Security in the Twenty-first Century
Quite simply, we as a country and as individuals are ill-prepared to meet the 
financial challenges of the twenty-first century. We are confronted with a rapidly 
aging population, actuarially unsound federal health and retirement programs, 
unsustainable trends of spending for government programs for senior citizens, and 
inadequate levels of private savings. We have promised too much and set aside too 
little. As a result, the proverbial “three-legged stool” of resources for retirement 
security—Social Security, personal savings, and private pension plans—that 
traditionally has financed Americans’ retirement is becoming increasingly 
unstable and in need of repair.
Americans Know There Is a Problem
The problem is not one of abstract budgetary significance. Americans are anxious 
about their retirement, even at a time in which they are buoyed by high consumer 
confidence and the lowest level of unemployment in decades. Less than one in four 
Americans is “very confident” about being able to provide himself with a 
comfortable retirement.2 The issue that causes the most insecurity for the average 
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American is the uncertainty as to whether he will be able to retire in comfort.3 Not 
only are Americans concerned that their own financial resources will be 
inadequate to provide for their retirement needs,4 they no longer have confidence 
that the federal safety net—which has helped many seniors to avoid poverty—will 
be there to support them when they retire.5
For the past half century, a secure retirement has been part of the American 
dream. Now, however, as a result of immutable demographic changes, 
unsustainable fiscal trends, imprudent governmental policies, and individual 
choices, this dream may elude many Americans—or become an untenable 
economic burden on the next generation.
2. Paul Yakoboski and Pamela Ostuw, “What Is Your Savings Personality? The 1998 
Retirement Confidence Survey,” Employee Benefits Research Institute (EBRI) Issue Brief No. 200, 
August 1998, p. 7.
3. USA Today poll, October 26, 1996.
4. “Confronting the Savings Crisis: Perceptions and Attitudes About Retirement and 
Financial Planning,” Seventh Annual Merrill Lynch Retirement Planning Survey, 1995, p. 2.
5. Ibid., pp. 2, 4.
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Americans Are Getting Older
Simply put, America is growing older. The aging of America has immense 
implications—both economic and social—for the country as a whole and for 
individuals.
The baby boom generation (the cohort born between 1946 and 1964) has 
exerted a profound effect on the United States at every stage of its collective 
development because of its massive size. The retirement of the baby boomers will 
prove no different.
Unfortunately, the baby boomers threaten to overwhelm the social insurance 
programs—Social Security and Medicare—as they presently are structured. These 
programs have thrived when funded by a growing number of working Americans, 
but they are not expected to have the necessary resources to meet future obligations 
unless corrective action is taken. For example:
 This year 200,000 Americans will turn 65 years old. In just 15 years, 1.6 
million will be at least this age.6
 In 1900, 1 in 25 Americans was older than 65 years of age. Today, 1 in 8 
Americans is 65 or older. By 2030, this percentage will increase to more 
than 20 percent, or 1 in 5. As a point of reference, the percentage of people 
over the age of 65 in Florida today is 18.4 percent; so, by 2030, the entire 
country will have similar demographics to Florida.7 By 2040, nearly 1 in 4 
will be 65 or older.8
 Today, there are approximately 24 million Americans over the age of 70. By 
2030, the number will double to 48 million.9
Americans Are Living Longer but Not Necessarily Working 
Longer
As the large baby boom generation moves into retirement, one other complicating 
demographic factor arises: Americans are living longer.
 When Otto Von Bismarck created the first public pension system in 
Germany in 1891, the age for collecting benefits was set at 65 but the 
average life expectancy was just 45. When Social Security was created, the 
United States adopted 65 as the age at which one could receive full benefits. 
The average life expectancy at that time was 61 years, but today it is 
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Sixty-Five Plus in the U.S.,”
at http://www.census.gov, May 1995, p. 1.
7. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Population Projections of the 
United States, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin, 1993–2050,” Current Population Report 
No. P25–1104 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), Table 2.
8. Ibid.
9. Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform, Final Report to the President 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 13.
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approximately 76; by the year 2025, it is expected to rise to 78.10
 At age 65 years, men are expected to live another 15 years, and women 
nearly 20 more years.11
 One in three baby girls born today is expected to reach nearly 90 years of 
age.12
10. Social Security Administration, 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 63.
11. Ibid.
12. Based on Annual Statistical Supplement, Social Security Bulletin 1998,  p. 182, and 
intermediate data products used in the production of Social Security Administration, 1998 Annual 
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability 
Insurance Trust Funds (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998).
Source: 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 3.
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Even as Americans live longer, they have been retiring earlier. In 1965, 57 
percent of the population aged 55–65 was in the workforce. Today, that figure has 
dropped to 38 percent. Further, more than 70 percent of Social Security 
beneficiaries retire early, that is, before age 65.13 As a result of these shifts, the 
average American will spend one-third of his adult life in retirement. The 
proverbial “golden years” of retirement are becoming the “golden decades.” Those 
who instituted our federal safety net programs did not contemplate these 
significant changes over time.
Fewer Workers Will Be Available to Support the Growing 
Number of Retirees
A final complicating factor is the “baby bust” generation—the relatively small 
generation that follows the baby boomers. The average family had three children 
during the boom years (1946–1964), but that number decreased to less than two 
children from 1970 to 1990.14 This has led to the marked decrease in the ratio of 
workers to Social Security beneficiaries. In 1950, there were 16.5 workers per 
beneficiary, but today there are merely 3.3 workers to support each beneficiary. By 
2030, the ratio is expected to drop even further, to 2 workers supporting each 
beneficiary.15 With productive capacity shrinking as the traditional labor force 
declines, only exceptional growth in productivity could ensure sufficient resources 
to sustain rising standards of living for aged and working Americans alike.
What Do These Trends Mean for Social Security?
Because Social Security is funded via intergenerational transfers, the lower fertility 
rates of the baby busters and the increasing longevity of the baby boomers have 
combined to erode the long-term solvency of the Social Security program.16 Even 
though the financing problem is not immediate, there is widespread agreement that 
13. Based on the OASDI’s “Table of Numbers and Average Amount of Retired-Worker 
Benefits in Current Payments Status with and without Reduction for Early Retirement, by Sex, 
1993–1997,” at http://www.tp.ssa.gov/pub/statistics/ic3.
14. Based on “Table of Selected Demographic Assumptions by Alternative,” Social Security 
Administration, 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 63.
15. Based on “Table of Comparison of OASDI-Covered Workers and Beneficiaries by 
Alternative Years,” Social Security Administration, 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of 
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, p. 124.
We owe it to those who will retire after the turn of the century to be given sufficient 
advance notice to make what alterations in retirement planning may be required. 
The longer we wait to make what are surely inevitable adjustments, the more 
difficult they will become.
—Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
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the financial problem should be addressed soon if savings are to mitigate the 
impact of whatever reductions in benefits are chosen.
Beginning in 2008, the first baby boomers will reach 62, the age at which they 
become eligible for early retirement benefits. In its most recent report, the Social 
Security Board of Trustees tells us that shortly thereafter, Social Security will 
begin to experience an annual operating deficit.17 This is true even though the 
current annual Trust Fund surplus is approximately $100 billion (including 
interest).18
The system then will begin to draw down its massive Trust Fund, which will 
have been accumulating principal and interest for decades. According to the 
trustees, the annual shortfalls will be bridged by Trust Fund interest alone until 
2021. By that time, the majority of baby boomers will have retired and annual 
operating deficits will have soared to the point at which all interest is exhausted, 
and the system will begin to draw down Trust Fund principal. In 2032—despite all 
the years of surpluses—the Trust Fund will be exhausted, and revenue paid into the 
system at that time is expected to meet only approximately three-quarters of 
promised benefits. Accordingly, even though the Trust Fund will not become 
“insolvent” for just over three decades as defined under government accounting 
rules, this scenario nevertheless assumes that higher taxes will be imposed on 
future generations.
Insolvency versus Operating Shortfall
Moreover, reliance on the Trust Fund is misplaced. The massive account into 
which the annual operating surpluses are ostensibly deposited exists largely as a 
budgetary artifice instead of as a pool of actual assets. About one-half the Trust 
Fund surplus reflects the excess flow of payroll taxes over annual outlays to 
current beneficiaries. Under current law, Social Security surpluses can be invested 
only in federal treasury obligations that are credited to the Trust Fund. The 
government uses the money it borrows from the Trust Fund to meet current 
operating expenses or pay down national debt. The accumulated interest on these 
16. The federal disability insurance program, referred to as DI, is in worse financial shape 
than the OASI Trust Fund. The Commission, however, did not address the issues raised by the 
federal disability insurance program.
17. Social Security Administration, 1998 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Highlights, April 
1998, at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR98.
18. Ibid., Table II.F.3.
It is important to address the financing of both the OASDI and DI programs soon to 
allow time for phasing in any necessary changes and for workers to adjust their 
retirement plans to take account of those changes. The impact of the changes in 
the current program will be minimized if they are enacted soon.
—From the 1998 OASDI Trustees Report (Highlights section)
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obligations accounts for approximately one-half the Trust Fund surplus.
Although, in theory, there is a Social Security Trust Fund that is accumulating 
large interest payments, in reality, the Trust Fund simply represents IOUs from one 
part of the government to another.19
The painful payback begins in 2013, when the Social Security system starts to 
take in less revenue than it pays out in benefits. At that point, the federal 
government will have to face two very unpleasant realities. First, the absence of 
cash flow into the Trust Fund will deprive the government of a source of revenue it 
has used to meet current operating expenses. Second, and perhaps more important, 
starting in 2013 the government will have to find the money to pay off its debt to 
the Social Security system. The annual shortfalls will increase rapidly thereafter, 
from an estimated $49 billion in 2015 to $684 billion in 2030.20 Even though a 
large amount theoretically will remain of the Social Security Trust Fund, the 
federal government will either have to squeeze all non–Social Security parts of the 
government in order to service the obligations of the Social Security system, raise 
taxes, borrow from the public, or reduce the promised benefits.
19. It should be noted that these federal obligations have the full faith and credit of the federal 
government behind them. The fiscal concern, as discussed later in this report, is the manner in 
which the government obtains the resources to meet the massive obligations.
20. Social Security Administration, 1998 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the 
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Table III-B4, 
excluding interest, p. 181.
Source: Social Security Administration, 1998 OASDI Trustees Report.
Chart 3:
The Worker-per-Retiree Ratio Is Plummeting
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Payroll Tax Increases Are Not the Answer
While funding gaps can be bridged by raising payroll taxes, this would impose a 
substantial burden on many American families. Indeed, nearly 80 percent of 
families pay more in payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare combined) than 
in income taxes.21
Although a payroll tax hike of 2 percent imposed immediately on all working 
Americans would, in theory, address Social Security’s long-term actuarial 
deficiency by beefing up the current Social Security surplus, it would do little to 
alleviate the tremendous cash flow problems that arise when all the baby boomers 
are in retirement. Moreover, this would only exacerbate the tendency of the federal 
government to spend the Social Security surplus on other programs.
Public support for payroll tax increases would have its limits as the concern of 
today’s workers grew with regard to the rate of return the present system yields on 
their significant lifetime contributions to Social Security in the form of payroll 
taxes. In order to provide the current level of benefits, Social Security payroll taxes 
have risen since the inception of the program from 2 percent to 12.4 percent, and 
Table 1: Financial Status of Social Securitya
a. Source: 1998 Board of Trustees Report, Office of 
the Chief Actuary, Social Security Administration, 
Table III–B-4.
Year Income(Excluding Interest) Outgo
Surplus/
Deficit
($ in billions, 1998 intermediate projection 
of Social Security Trustees)
1998 435 383 52
1999 450 396 54
2000 468 413 54
2005 585 533 52
2010 756 724 32
2015 965 1,014 -49
2020 1,217 1,430 -214
2025 1,525 1,958 -433
2030 1,917 2,601 -684
2035 2,418 3,342 -925
2040 3,043 4,190 -1,147
21. Combined employee and employer portions of payroll taxes; figures for 1995 from 
“Estimates of Federal Tax Liabilities For Individuals and Families by Income Category and Family 
Type for 1995 and 1999,” Congressional Budget Office (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, May 1998), p. 5.
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the wage base (that is, the income limit up to which one is taxed) from $3,000 to 
$68,400.22 In the view of the Commission, these “traditional” solutions to financial 
shortfalls also have proved only temporary in nature, due to the fact that they treat 
a symptom of the problem rather than remedying faults in the design of the 
underlying system that continually lead to the funding shortfalls. For those 
reasons, the Commission chose programmatic reforms, as opposed to increased 
taxes, to stave off the Social Security system’s insolvency. For a detailed summary 
of the Commission’s recommendations on Social Security reforms, see Appendix 
A.
Public Pension Solvency Is Only One Ingredient
Even as policymakers devise a plan to ensure the future solvency of the Social 
Security Trust Fund, they know their job is not done. Studies reveal that Social 
Security forms the bulk of retirement income for the majority of retired 
Americans. Social Security benefits provide the major source of income for 66 
percent of beneficiaries—and the only source of income for 18 percent.23 
Considering that the maximum Social Security benefit paid this year is $1,342 per 
22. Dave Koitz, “New Benefit Awards as a Percentage of Final Year’s Earnings,” Social 
Security: Brief Facts and Statistics, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress 
No. 94–27 EPW, updated May 1998, pp. 4 and 5.
Chart 4:
The Payroll Tax for Social Security Has Risen Over Time
(Increases in tax rates and earning base, 1937–1987)
Source: Social Security Administration, 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees,
pp. 34–35 (based on Table of Contribution and Benefit Base and Contribution Rates).
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month, and that the benefit for a person who earned an average salary is $938 per 
month,24 more needs to be done to help to ensure adequate retirement for all 
Americans. Social Security benefits were intended only to provide an income 
“floor” for beneficiaries. In other words, retirement security requires that public 
pensions be supplemented by individual savings and private pension benefits. The 
average monthly Social Security benefit for a retired worker in July 1998 was 
$767,25 less than the gross monthly salary from a minimum wage job.26
Nor can the federal government continue to spend increasing amounts of 
money on “automatic spending” programs without consequence.
Mandatory spending and interest on the national debt account for nearly two-
thirds of current federal spending, according to the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO).27 The President’s Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform 
in 1994 found that, without changes, entitlement programs will consume all 
federal revenues by 2030—and, if interest on the national debt is included in the 
23. Age 65 and older (1996), Social Security Administration Office of Research, Evaluation, 
and Statistics, Fast Facts and Figures About Social Security 1998, p. 7.
24. Social Security Administration Web site, http://www.ssa.gov, Budget and Planning, 
Actuarial Information, Benefit Amounts for Hypothetical Cases.
25. Social Security Administration Web site, http://www.ssa.gov, Highlights of Social Security 
Data, July 1998.
26. Assuming 160 work hours per month (four weeks/40 hours) at current federal minimum 
wage of $5.15 per hour. There is a difference between the benefit of a worker earning the national 
average income and the average benefit paid by Social Security. The average Social Security benefit 
takes into account survivor’s benefits, those with very low earnings histories, and so forth.
27. Based on Congressional Budget Office, “Table of the Budget Outlook through 1997,” 
Economic and Budget Outlook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. xii.
Chart 5:
Reliance on Social Security
(percentage of beneficiary units with Social Security
as a major source of income, 1996)
Source: Survey, “Income with Population 55 or Older, 1996,” Office of Research Evaluation 
and Statistics, Social Security Administration.
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calculations, this date accelerates to 2018.28 The Balanced Budget Act of 199729 
and a strong economy have improved the short-term outlook. But the trend remains 
unsustainable. And, even though the CBO recently predicted additional federal 
government surpluses, it underscored that when the baby boomers begin to retire, 
annual deficits will return and grow increasingly larger thereafter, due primarily to 
growth in entitlement expenditures on the elderly.30
The current unfunded liability of Social Security through 2070 is estimated to 
be $5.3 trillion.31 Under present law, benefits under Social Security and Medicare 
combined will exceed current projected payroll tax revenues by nearly $19 trillion 
between 1997 and 2070.32
Although additional government resources can, and undoubtedly will, be 
diverted to meet a significant portion of the obligation, such expenditure does not 
come without a cost. Resources dedicated to old-age benefits will be unavailable 
for welfare programs, education, investments in infrastructure, national defense, or 
other government programs. This potential “squeezing out” of other priorities was 
of particular concern to Commission members and a principal reason for moving 
toward a partially prefunded Social Security system.
An Increased Role for Individual Responsibility
Because policymakers have overpromised when it comes to the future benefits of 
the system, debate about Social Security will take center stage in the 106th 
Congress. Increasingly, Americans are coming to the realization that they will have 
to assume greater responsibility for a secure retirement instead of relying on the 
limited resources of the government.
According to one public opinion poll, only 13 percent of workers expect Social 
Security to provide the largest portion of their retirement income. Furthermore,
21 percent of workers do not expect any retirement income from Social Security.33 
Many Americans understand the need to plan for their own retirement. 
Unfortunately, however, the realization that one needs to accumulate personal 
assets for retirement does not always translate into action.
Social Security benefits today, on average, replace approximately 42 percent of 
preretirement income for beneficiaries, a share that will fall to 34 percent in 2030.34 
Financial planners suggest that most people would need between 60 percent and 80 
percent of preretirement earnings to maintain their same standard of living in 
28. Based on figures from the Congressional Budget Office, “Long-Term Budget Outlook,” 
March 1997, p. xv.
29. H.R. 2015, P.L. 105–33.
30. Congressional Budget Office, “Long-Term Budgetary Pressures and Policy Options,” 
Summary, May 1998, p. 1.
31. OASDI, 1997 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees, p. 184.
32. Ibid.
33. Yakoboski and Ostuw, “What Is Your Savings Personality? The 1998 Retirement 
Confidence Survey,” p. 8.
34. New retiree age 65 in 1998. From Koitz, “New Benefit Awards as a Percentage of Final 
Year’s Earnings,” p. 10.
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retirement. Even if Social Security were able to maintain the current level of 
retirement income for future beneficiaries, private pensions and savings would 
have quite a gap to fill.
Employer-sponsored Pensions
Many private- and public-sector employers offer their workers a pension plan, 
either a defined-benefit plan (in which benefits are calculated by a formula and are 
based typically on pay, years of service, and other factors) or a defined-
contribution plan, such as a 401(k) plan (in which specified contributions are made 
to participant’s individual accounts, coming from either, or both, the employer or 
employee).
Pensions can be an important source of retirement income. In the past 20 years, 
the aggregate percentage of retirement income derived from private pensions has 
grown from 16 percent to 30 percent,35 but many workers do not participate in or 
have access to such plans.
 Fewer than 50 percent of workers participate in an employer-sponsored 
pension plan at any given time.36
 Fewer than 30 percent of low-income workers participate in an employer-
sponsored pension plan.37
 Only about 30 percent of employees of small businesses (businesses with 
100 or fewer employees) are covered by a pension plan at work, and, of 
these, and only 21 percent participate. This means that only about 10 
million out of the approximately 35 million employees of small businesses 
have access to a retirement plan at their job, and that only about 7 million of 
them actually participate.38
 Even though pension coverage at large businesses is much better—83 
percent of employees are covered by pension plans—only 64 percent of 
those eligible actually choose to participate in the plans.39
 Even those who do participate in an employer-provided pension plan often 
fail to take full advantage of the benefit. For example, of those contributing 
to 401(k) defined-contribution plans, only 21 percent put in the maximum 
amount that their employer would match.40
35. Based on EBRI, “Table of Total Retirement Benefit Payments,” Retirement Prospects in a 
Defined Contribution World, April 30, 1997.
36. “Employment-Based Retirement Income Benefits: Analysis of the April 1993 Current 
Population Survey,” EBRI Special Report, September 1994, p. 1.
37. Based on Carolyn Pemberton and Deborah Holmes, eds., “Table of Retirement Plan 
Sponsorship, Participation, and Vesting, 1993,” Databook on Employee Benefits, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: EBRI, 1996), p. 73.
38. From EBRI and American Savings Education Council, “Small Business Employer 
Retirement Survey,” press release, June 2, 1998.
39. Ibid.
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The Leakage of Retirement Savings
An additional problem with pension plans is that many who do participate end up 
withdrawing a significant portion of the assets prior to retirement. Specifically, one 
of every four participants intends to use pension savings for making a 
downpayment on a house or paying for a child’s education.41 In 1996, only 40 
percent of all distributions from defined-contribution plans made to people 
changing jobs were rolled over into other tax-deferred retirement plans.42 The 
statistics become even worse for accounts with fewer assets: only 20 percent of 
distributions of less then $3,500 were rolled over into tax-deferred retirement 
accounts.43
More often than not, those retirement assets not rolled over are simply spent. 
Thus, the worker not only has lost assets, he also has squandered valuable time 
needed for financial assets to grow through “compounding.” The preservation of 
40. “The Reality of Retirement Today: Lessons in Planning for Tomorrow,” EBRI Issue Brief, 
January 1997, p. 8.
41. Marshall Carter, “Trends in World Financial Markets,” speech to the Boston Economic 
Club, April 5, 1995, p. 9.
42. Paul Yakoboski, “Large Lump-Sum Rollovers and Cashouts,” EBRI Issue Brief No. 188, 
August 1997, p. 7.
43. Ibid.
Source: Based on Carolyn Pemberton and Deborah Holmes, eds., “Table of Retirement Plan 
Sponsorship, Participation, and Vesting, 1993,” Databook on Employee Benefits, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: EBRI, 1996), p. 73.
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even a modest amount of retirement plan distributions over time can grow to 
considerable sums over the course of a full career.
The changing nature of the labor force also affects the accumulation of pension 
assets. Today, it is not unusual for a worker to have several employers throughout 
his career. Workers changing jobs cannot always take their pensions with them. 
Different types of pension plans and differing regulatory rules can limit the 
“portability” of assets from one employer’s plan to another. The inability to 
transfer pension assets freely could yield a lower retirement income than if the 
worker had been able to move those assets independently from one plan to the next 
as easily as he had changed jobs. Moreover, pension assets can be lost if there is no 
portability, resulting in increasing issues associated with “missing participants” 
who cannot be found due to job and address changes. The NCRP was concerned 
that the lack of portability, coupled with “leakage,” has such a significant adverse 
effect on the accumulation of retirement assets.
Despite improvements over the past decade, vast room for improvement 
remains in pension participation, both on the part of the employer in making plans 
available, and on the part of the employee in taking full advantage of such plans.
For the millions of Americans who do not have a retirement savings vehicle 
available to them through their employers, accumulating financial resources for 
retirement will depend on personal savings habits.
Personal Savings
Individual savings accumulated during working years can help to ensure a 
financially secure retirement. This is especially necessary, as highlighted above, 
for those individuals who do not participate in a pension plan and rely 
disproportionately on Social Security benefits as their means of a modest floor of 
income protection.
Evidence indicates that Americans have become increasingly aware of the 
importance of personal savings (for example, IRAs, stocks, bonds, bank accounts, 
and personal assets including home equity) for retirement security, having been 
bombarded by mountains of data and studies appearing in the media and through 
both public and private institutions. This educational effort is having a positive 
effect. A recent poll reveals that nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of Americans 
personally had saved money for retirement at some point in 1998.44 Although the 
fact that the majority of Americans are saving is a very positive trend, it still means 
that over one-third is not saving for retirement at all. Furthermore, many of those 
who are saving apparently are not putting away anything close to the amounts 
necessary to ensure an adequate retirement. In 1998, the personal savings rate for 
Americans was a scant 3.9 percent of disposable income, approaching the savings 
lows of the Great Depression.45 (In the last quarter of the year, the rate actually was 
44. Yakoboski and Ostuw, “What Is Your Savings Personality? The 1998 Retirement 
Confidence Survey,” p. 9.
45. Savings as a percentage of disposable income. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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negative.) By contrast, in 1981 the personal savings rate was 9.1 percent of 
income.46 This precipitous drop in the rate of saving, concludes one study, means 
that families are saving at only about one-third the rate necessary to replicate their 
present standard of living in retirement.47
One indication of the attitude of Americans toward savings is their use of 
IRAs. In 1992, the most recent year for which figures are available, only 10 
percent of eligible taxpayer households made tax-deductible contributions to 
IRAs, even though two-thirds of American households were eligible.48 If 
Americans are not taking greater advantage of a savings instrument that actually 
can lower their taxes, it is unlikely that they are taking advantage of other 
significant retirement savings.
It is little wonder, then, that a recent survey shows that only 24 percent of 
workers say they are “very confident” about being able to provide themselves with 
a comfortable retirement.49
One explanation for such a lack of collective confidence is that increased 
awareness of retirement needs can lead to intimidation and discouragement. A 
vital first step toward preparing for retirement is to estimate as accurately as 
46. Ibid.
47. Does not include housing wealth. From a study conducted by B. Douglas Bernheim of 
Stanford University, cited in Jonathan Weisman, “Rainy Days Get No Respect as Savings Rate 
Droops,” Congressional Quarterly, January 17, 1998, p. 116.
48. Paul Yakoboski, “IRA Eligibility and Usage,” EBRI Notes, Vol. 16, No. 4 (April 1995),
p. 6.
49. Yakoboski and Ostuw, “What Is Your Savings Personality? The 1998 Retirement 
Confidence Survey,” p. 7.
Source: “The Great Social Security Debate,” presentation delivered in Cranston, R.I., July 1, 
1998.
Chart 7:
Personal Savings
(excluding housing costs, the average U.S. household has 
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possible how much money one will need. Often, the resulting estimated gross 
figures in these calculations are staggering, in the hundreds of thousands of dollars 
for even those of relatively modest income whose goal is only to maintain their 
present lifestyle in retirement. Such information can be a powerful motivator for 
action with some, but can be daunting to others who may conclude that it is useless 
even to try to attain such sums.
Even among those who are not presently saving, however, the clear majority 
(55 percent) admit that it is reasonably possible to save $20 a week for retirement.50 
In today’s world, $20 each week involves only very modest changes in
 
one’s 
present behavior, perhaps as simple as not buying that gourmet cup of coffee every 
day or bringing lunch to work from home two or three days a week. Saving that 
modest amount of money consistently over a working career, however, could have 
a huge impact on one’s lifestyle in retirement.
Although the estimated needs for retirement figures can be intimidating, the 
power of compounding over a long period of time can be equally staggering. For 
example, if a 25-year-old started saving that $20 per week and continued to do so 
until he retired at age 65, assuming a very modest rate of return of 5 percent, his 
nest egg would be nearly $132,000.51
It is critically important to start saving early; time is the key to the power of 
compounding. For example, if a 25-year-old person began saving $50 each week 
until he reached age 65 (assuming a return of 5 percent on those savings), he would 
have amassed approximately $302,305. If that same person waited until age 35 to 
start saving the same $50, however—assuming the same rate of return—his total at 
age 65 would be approximately half ($165,130) of what he would have by starting 
to save just 10 years earlier.52
50. Ibid., p. 11.
51. Ibid.
Source: American Academy of Actuaries. Ron Gebhardtsbauer, senior pension fellow, 
“Reasons for a National Retirement Income Policy,” September 8, 1997 (speech).
Chart 8:
Many Near-Retirees Save Too Little
(retirement savings of those aged 51–61, in thousands of dollars)
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The fact that many Americans fail to build adequate retirement savings is not 
for lack of available tools. The trick is getting people to utilize those instruments to 
their fullest advantage. The challenge for government lies in providing the proper 
level of incentives to bolster personal savings and, at a minimum, not enacting 
policies that make it more difficult for employers and individuals to establish 
retirement savings plans. Increased private rates of saving, of course, will relieve 
some of the pressure on public assistance: the more Americans save personally and 
through their employer pension plans, the more capital will become available to 
grow the economy, which, in turn, will provide the government with more power to 
ensure the stability of the Social Security system. The more Americans save 
personally, the more secure their personal retirements. This comprehensive view of 
retirement security was the cornerstone of the NCRP’s ideology and precipitated 
the comprehensive approach to retirement savings described below.
A Comprehensive Plan Proposed
The Commission undertook to design a plan that would improve each of the three 
legs of retirement savings.
The result of the Commission’s 18-month effort is the 21st Century Retirement 
Security Plan (the Plan), which the Commission’s members adopted unanimously. 
52. American Savings Education Council, 401(k) Growth Calculator (Boston, Mass.: 
Advantage Publications, 1995).
Chart 9:
Most Younger Americans Expect to Rely More on Savings
Source: EBRI, The 1997 Retirement Confidence Survey, Summary of Findings,
October 1997, p. 2.
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Why Did CSIS Establish a National Commission
on Retirement Policy?
As discussed in the preceding sections, laying the foundation for economic growth and 
prosperity in the face of the profound demographic changes that will occur early in the next 
century is, perhaps, the most difficult challenge facing our country. The imminent retirement of 
the baby boom generation, combined with longer life expectancies and poor fiscal discipline, will 
place extraordinary pressure on the fabric of the federal safety net programs and could imperil 
the standard of living of future generations. Unless Americans save more and spend less, our 
country will be confronted with a Hobson’s choice: dramatically lower standards of living for 
current retirees or an untenable tax burden on future retirees.
CSIS established the National Commission on Retirement Policy to respond to these 
challenges. Created in January 1997, the 24-member commission was composed of leaders 
from the public and private sectors and included policymakers, economists, and experts on 
retirement savings. These leaders came together to deliberate the facts and design a proposal 
to meet the challenge of ensuring a financially secure retirement for all Americans as well as to 
place the country on a path toward long-term economic security.
The NCRP believes that essential elements of a comprehensive plan to address retirement 
security in the twenty-first century must:
• reform Social Security to provide long-term solvency to the system;
• enhance the ability of employers to provide pensions and savings plans;
• stimulate growth in personal savings; and
• educate the public about the need to plan, save, and invest for retirement.
The NCRP established as its goal that a “broad-based, bipartisan national retirement policy 
should be developed and implemented as soon as practicable to respond to this [retirement 
security] challenge.” The NCRP established this goal after adopting three guiding principles at 
the beginning of its deliberative process:
1. National retirement policy should be designed to enable Americans to enjoy a 
reasonable standard of living in their retirement years. It should encompass 
government programs that require a floor of financial support for elderly retirees as well 
as initiatives that encourage and facilitate group (that is, employer) and individual 
saving to provide additional retirement income above the floor of support.
2. National retirement policy should contribute to long-term growth and economic 
prosperity.
3. Government programs for elderly retirees should be financially sound and 
economically sustainable. The costs of financing these programs and other initiatives 
that encourage and facilitate national saving should be borne equitably.
In order to develop these elements, the NCRP embarked on an extensive examination of the 
problems the United States and its citizens face with respect to future retirement and a 
deliberative debate on suggested solutions.
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The Plan is unique in its comprehensive bipartisan approach for repairing and 
improving all three major sources of retirement income. It reflects substantive 
policy changes in both the public and private savings areas.
At the heart of the Plan is a commitment to enhance retirement security for all 
Americans, especially those most in need. The Plan is grounded in a basic faith in, 
and optimism about, the future of our country, the economy, and the American 
people. The Plan would allow individuals to harness for themselves a piece of the 
power and growth potential that has driven our country to its preeminence—the 
free-market system—to the end of improving the fate both of the individual and of 
the country. The Plan also would allow the individual to
 
take an active part in the 
investment of a portion of his Social Security payroll taxes while maintaining a 
modified guaranteed benefit. The key is that managed risk, in the context of the 
prolonged, strong U.S. economic climate and the luxury of time, has proved quite 
rewarding for both the United States and its citizens.
Although improvements conceivably could be made to individual elements of 
the Plan, the Commission believes that the complete package of reforms offers a 
unified national retirement policy that is fiscally responsible, practically 
achievable, and politically viable.
Source: American Savings Education Council, 401(k) Growth Calculator (Boston, Mass.: 
Advantage Publications). Note: The advantage of saving earlier is offset somewhat by the effect of 
inflation; the opportunity cost of saving is greater in the earliest 10 years than it is later. The 
benefits of compounding, however, more than make up the difference.
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A Comprehensive Plan for a Complex Problem
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan is unique in that it is a comprehensive 
approach to retirement security that incorporates a number of elements that work 
together to enhance retirement security for all Americans. The Plan is designed not 
only to restore Social Security to a sound financial footing, but also to expand 
pension coverage and enhance personal savings opportunities. Much like the 
diversification of investments to spread risk, the more evenly spread one’s 
retirement assets are among Social Security, private pensions, and personal 
savings, the greater the chances for a successful, secure retirement.
Preserving Universal Social Security
Perhaps the most novel proposals in the Commission’s Plan are the creation of 
ISAs, which would allow for individual investment of a portion of existing Social 
Security payroll taxes, and the establishment of a new Minimum Benefit 
Guarantee, which would protect the most vulnerable in our society from poverty. 
The Plan’s two-tiered approach to Social Security reform—involving both a 
traditional defined benefit and individual accounts—would lessen the huge 
unfunded liability on future generations and offer the potential for improved 
benefits for all workers. The combined traditional Social Security benefit and ISA 
would improve retirement income by providing higher rates of return and 
replacement rates on preretirement income than the current system. The 
Commission’s Plan also would strengthen basic safety through the establishment 
of a guaranteed minimum Social Security benefit, which would ensure that 
someone who worked throughout his life would receive at least a poverty-level 
Social Security benefit—a protection that does not exist under current law.
The Commission believes this approach offers several advantages. It would 
provide greater retirement income security for those most in need; it would evoke a 
sense of thrift among workers who had not invested previously; it should increase 
the national savings rate; and it would increase the return on the earnings of 
American workers. Although many legitimate issues remain as to how best to 
structure and administer individual accounts, the Commission believes 
policymakers should work through these issues to design a system that 
incorporates this component.
The Plan Would Enhance Private Savings
The Commission recognized that Social Security benefits alone, although 
presenting a modest floor of income protection, fall far short of providing for a 
secure retirement. Social Security benefits replace less than half of the 
preretirement income for the average-income worker. Clearly, supplemental 
retirement resources are an essential component for retired Americans to achieve 
adequate financial independence in their golden years.
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Despite the demonstrated need, Americans as a whole fail to accumulate the 
assets necessary to provide for any meaningful income supplement to Social 
Security in retirement. Only about one-half the workforce participates in an 
employer-sponsored pension plan, and coverage reaches alarmingly low levels 
among small business, low-income, and minority workers. The tax code—despite 
some recent improvements—seems to have been written with an eye more focused 
on federal revenues than on encouraging personal savings. Not surprisingly, 
personal savings rates, even in this period of economic expansion, have reached 
Depression-era lows.
It is important to remember that pension coverage and personal savings are 
totally voluntary. Employers are not compelled by law to offer pension plans; nor 
are individuals required to save for their futures. The Commission believes that 
incentives should be enhanced and simplified so that these underutilized savings 
vehicles would become more effective tools for accumulating sufficient retirement 
assets. Therefore, although restoring the fiscal stability of Social Security is 
imperative for ensuring a floor of income for future retirees, the 21st Century 
Retirement Plan simultaneously would strengthen the other two legs of retirement 
income.
Higher Savings Are the Key to National Economic Growth
The benefits of higher savings affect us as individuals and as a country. Increased 
individual savings can have a direct correlation on economic growth by increasing 
the amount of investment capital available to businesses and lowering borrowing 
costs. Economic growth yields more revenue and a stronger economy so that the 
government will be better able to meet the financial obligations it has undertaken. 
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan was designed to encourage savings and 
investment on the individual level, which, in turn, would generate an interplay of 
forces with positive macroeconomic ramifications on a national level.
Therefore, restoring the long-term solvency of the federal retirement systems, 
while absolutely essential, cannot represent the sole objective of any federal 
retirement plan aimed at ensuring that all Americans can retire with financial 
security. Policymakers must realize that changes imposed on the structure of Social 
Security can have a profound effect on the private pension structure and private 
savings needs. This is precisely the aim of the 21st Century Retirement Security 
Plan.
Strengthening the three traditional principal sources of retirement 
simultaneously would allow the American worker access to a variety of tools with 
which to build a secure retirement and, at the same time, would strengthen the U.S. 
economy by fostering a country of savers.
The fact that the NCRP debated these very issues and was able to reach a 
consensus is an encouraging sign as the debate moves toward concrete action in the 
halls of Congress and inside the Clinton administration. The 21st Century 
Retirement Security Plan is tangible evidence that a bipartisan group of 
policymakers can reach agreement on even the toughest and most emotional 
issues. The Commission hopes its Plan will serve our current elected leaders well 
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as they undertake to save the Social Security program and shore up private savings 
in the United States. This is an important journey we, as Americans, will endeavor 
to take together. We hope the 21st Century Retirement Security Plan will help to 
map the rocky terrain that lies ahead.
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A P P E N D I X  A
The 21st Century Retirement 
Security Plan in Detail
This document provides a more detailed description of the 21st Century 
Retirement Security Plan. It describes the Commission’s specific proposals to 
improve the current system, enhance private pension plans, and encourage 
personal savings. It also includes the underlying assumptions that the Commission 
used, discusses issues related to the administration of individual accounts, 
compares three additional NCRP reform plans, and provides an explanation of 
distributional effects.
Social Security: Detailed Description
Introduction to Detailed Description
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan reflects the Commission’s finding that 
the challenge facing Social Security is fundamentally demographic. Social 
Security has functioned efficiently and well for America’s seniors during the 
periods in which working generations have been sufficiently numerous to provide 
for retirees on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The shape of the demographic curve that the United States will move through 
early in the next century makes advance funding desirable for Social Security in 
order to avoid unacceptable tax burdens on the economy of the twenty-first 
century. It also is imperative that the Social Security system offer strengthened 
rewards for work as an extra safeguard against declining worker–collector ratios.
This section describes in further detail the specific proposals in the 
Commission’s Plan for strengthening the Social Security system. These proposals 
would modernize the Social Security system to allow individuals more personal 
choice and greater growth potential for their funds through the creation of ISAs, 
funded by payroll contributions. The Plan would keep Social Security solvent for 
the next 70 years without tax increases; improve benefits for lower-income 
workers; encourage seniors to continue working by allowing them to keep their 
earnings without reducing their benefits; and establish minimum benefits to help 
the most vulnerable. Provisions to shift ages of eligibility gradually upward reflect 
the necessity to limit the decline in the worker-to-collector ratio.
The detailed descriptions that follow set forth the details of these proposals and 
compare them with present law, where applicable, to explain the reasons the 
Commission included them in its Plan.
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Social Security: Recommendations
Individual Security Accounts
Refund two percentage points of the current 12.4-percent payroll tax into 
individual accounts.
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan would refund two percentage 
points of Social Security’s current 12.4 percent Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program tax into ISAs. This feature is included 
for the following reasons, as well as for others:
1. Confining reforms to the traditional alternatives, such as increasing tax 
revenues or reducing benefit growth, would have adverse effects on the rate of 
return that individual beneficiaries, especially young workers, received from 
Social Security. Even though the rate of return is not the only criterion by 
which Social Security reforms should be evaluated, it is nevertheless an 
important means of measuring the intergenerational equity of the program as 
well as the enduring political support it is likely to enjoy.
2. The current structure of the system, in which Social Security’s assets are 
invested in the aggregate in treasury securities alone, precludes advance 
funding because these securities are redeemed solely by general taxation. Thus, 
an unrestructured system mandates that the burden of funding tomorrow’s 
retirement income benefits will fall exclusively on tomorrow’s taxpayers. In 
order to fund some of the future benefits of Social Security directly, it would 
become necessary that a portion of these benefits be financed with other assets.
3. The Commission believes that most Americans would receive more retirement 
income from the Social Security program if ISAs were incorporated into the 
system than they would receive if traditional solutions alone were used to bring 
the system back into balance.
4. The Commission also believes that, even with conservative estimates of the 
rates of return, ISAs would not entail a significant increase in economic risk 
for beneficiaries when combined with the additional protections against 
poverty contained in the Plan.
5. The Commission is confident that the transition costs to such a system are 
manageable. Today, the OASDI system generates a surplus of sufficient size to 
permit two percentage points of the current payroll tax to be refunded into 
ISAs. Assets would continue to accumulate within the traditional Social 
Security Trust Fund, of which no principal need be redeemed in the short term 
in order to meet benefit promises to current beneficiaries. Furthermore, 
updated federal unified budget projections suggest that, by the time of the 
enactment of this Plan, it will be possible for the federal government to permit 
a payroll tax refund of 2 percent of payroll without incurring a federal deficit.
6. Because the near-term federal unified budget surplus is attributable to the 
annual operating surplus of the OASDI program, the Commission deemed it 
appropriate to use a portion of this latter surplus explicitly to fund in advance 
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the future liabilities of the Social Security system instead of going to 
underwrite the present-day operations of the federal government.
7. The Commission believed that requiring an additional contribution from 
individuals above the current 12.4 percent tax rate as governed by the Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)—even though it could improve the rate of 
return that individuals received from Social Security—would be a less 
desirable means of establishing ISAs. The Commission believes that 
contributors would perceive an extra mandatory contribution as a tax increase 
that would absorb income that no longer would be available for other pressing 
needs, ranging from meeting Medicare costs to providing additional retirement 
income through employer-provided pensions and personal saving.
Although the Commission’s Plan would not require additional contributions 
beyond the current 12.4 percent OASDI tax rate, individuals would be permitted to 
save up to an additional $2,000 per year (net of any IRA contributions) as an 
additional element of any Social Security ISA. This $2,000 limit would be indexed 
annually for inflation. Any voluntary contributions to an ISA would receive the 
same tax treatment as nondeductible IRA contributions under current law; that is, 
contributions would not be tax-deductible and only taxes on accumulated earnings 
would be deferred until distributed. Voluntary contributions to an ISA would be 
permitted one year after the implementation of the mandatory ISA feature, 
provided that it is administratively feasible to do so.
The Commission devoted several hearings and meetings to the question of 
designing and administering individual accounts. Inefficiency in the design and 
administration of this system would produce several undesirable results, ranging 
from administrative costs that were larger than projected investment returns for 
low-income workers to unwieldy new administrative burdens on small employers. 
The Commission concluded that the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), the retirement 
savings plan of federal employees administered by the Office of Personnel 
Management, provides the best model for designing the personal account 
component in a way that does not introduce such difficulties. A further description 
of the Commission’s recommendations on the administration and regulation of 
ISAs is included below.
In addition, the Commission supports requiring the Social Security 
Administration to provide information to individuals on their Social Security 
benefits (for example, defined-benefit accounts and ISA benefits) once per year 
either in electronic or print format. This information should include reasonable and 
understandable ways for participants to estimate the value of their benefits at 
retirement. The government should lead by example in connection with providing 
information to taxpayers on their individual retirement benefits. Any such 
disclosures should address both a person’s base defined benefit and any ISA 
element. In addition, any projections should be based on reasonable and fully 
disclosed assumptions that are consistent with current law and the projected 
funding status of the Social Security program.
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Increase Minimum Benefits
The Commission recommends a minimum benefit provision that individuals would 
be eligible for after 20 years of covered earnings. All Social Security beneficiaries 
with 20 years of covered earnings would be guaranteed a benefit of at least 60 
percent of the poverty level, phasing upward at 2 percent with each year of covered 
earnings until it reaches 100 percent of the poverty level after 40 years of work. 
The minimum benefit provision would become fully effective in 2010.
This provision was included in each of the four plans developed by the Social 
Security Working Group. It reflects the view of the Commission that the 
progressivity of the traditional benefit structure within Social Security must be 
increased, especially if an ISA element is included, with which no progressive 
effect is assumed. This provision would shield low-income recipients from the 
adverse effects of other measures taken to restore the Social Security system to 
solvency. It also would ensure that individuals run no risk of being left in poverty 
despite a lifetime of work. The Commission notes that the benefits of this 
provision would extend beyond Social Security, likely reducing Social Security 
insurance expenditures over the long term.
Conform Eligibility Age for Benefits to Increased Life Span
The Commission recommends indexing the eligibility age for benefits to increased 
life spans by implementing the following schedule: The already-scheduled increase 
of two months each year in the normal retirement age, beginning in 2000, would be 
continued until it reached 70 at the end of 2029. At the same time, the early 
eligibility age would be increased by two months with each passing year, reaching 
65 in 2017. Starting after 2029, each retirement age would be lifted to maintain 
expected years of retirement at an approximately constant level.
This schedule for increasing the retirement age was included in all four of the 
Commission’s Social Security reform options developed by the Social Security 
Working Group of the NCRP for consideration by the full Commission. The origin 
of Social Security’s financing problems lie in the demographic shifts that resulted 
from changes in fertility rates and life expectancy. Consequently, reform proposals 
that do not address the declining ratio of workers to beneficiaries directly would be 
likely to see their efficacy diminish over time. The scheduled change in eligibility 
ages proposed by the NCRP would provide beneficiaries with, relative to other 
proposed changes that would affect benefits, significant time in which to adjust 
their retirement planning and also to accrue additional assets through their ISAs.
Current Law
The normal retirement age will rise gradually from 65 to 67, beginning with 
individuals who reach age 62 in 2000. Early retirement benefits still will be 
available at age 62 (age 60 for widows and widowers), but at lower levels than 
under current law.
The proposed increase in the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits is a 
key element in enabling the Plan to meet the goal of restoring long-term solvency 
to Social Security.
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When Social Security was established in the 1930s the average life expectancy 
was actually below the age of eligibility (age 65). Since that time, fortunately, the 
average life span has increased significantly so that average life expectancy today 
is 76 years. It is expected to rise to 78 by 2020 and continue its upward climb 
thereafter.
An unchanged age of eligibility for full benefits and an increased life 
expectancy add greatly to the fiscal pressure on the system over time. Americans 
are approaching a situation in which they will collect federal health and retirement 
benefits for an average of one-third of their lives. The Commission proposed to 
correct this imbalance with a gradual increase in the age of eligibility to keep the 
average number of years in retirement at approximately the same level over time.
Concern arose that a significant increase in the age of eligibility would present 
an undue hardship to workers in manual labor jobs. Although this concern is 
legitimate, it should be kept in mind that major technological and productivity 
improvements in the economy since the time Social Security was established have 
greatly reduced blue-collar, physically demanding jobs. Such improvements can be 
expected to continue in the future. A gradual increase in the age of eligibility to 70 
by 2029 would be fair when placed in the perspective that the architects of Social 
Security deemed 65 an appropriate age of eligibility in the 1930s. For those truly 
physically unable to continue work, the Commission’s Plan would retain a 
disability program similar to the current program.
The reduced level of benefits for those who opted for the early retirement age 
called for in the Commission’s Plan should be offset by other features of the Plan. 
Retirement security requires an integrated effort involving Social Security, private 
pensions, and personal savings equally, so if a worker found it too physically 
demanding to work beyond the age of eligibility for early retirement benefits, the 
other two legs of retirement savings (as a reminder, IRA distributions can be made 
without penalty at age 59½) should more than offset the reduction in benefits 
produced by the early retirement age benefit differential. Considering the 
improvements and incentives to save in the Plan, other retirement savings vehicles 
would have been building assets over time and would be available to help bridge 
any income gaps necessitated by early retirement.
Critics also cite the difficulty that older workers can have in retaining and 
finding employment. Although these concerns have a good deal of validity today, a 
major cause of this situation can be attributed to the relative abundance of younger 
workers. As the demographics change in the next century, the comparative number 
of younger replacement workers will decline significantly. The demand for older 
workers is likely to be strong. Once more, the work incentives incorporated in the 
Commission’s plan, such as adjustment of the early retirement benefit level and 
delayed retirement credit, would provide further tangible inducements for staying 
in the workforce longer.
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Include State and Local Government Employees
in the Social Security System
The Commission recommends covering all state and local government employees 
hired after 1999.
This provision was included in each of the four plans developed by the Social 
Security Working Group of the NCRP. Bringing new state and local employees 
into the Social Security system would contribute to its actuarial stability and is 
consistent with the philosophical goal of universal national participation in the 
Social Security program.
Current Law
Currently, approximately one-fourth of state and local government employees are 
not covered under the OASDI program. In the 1930s, state and local government 
employees were excluded from the program. In the 1950s, the employees of state 
and local governments received the opportunity to enter the system. In the 1990s, 
Congress enacted a law requiring that all public employees not covered by a public 
retirement plan be covered by Social Security.
Address Inequities between Two-earner and One-earner Couples
The Commission recommends a reduction in the percentage of Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA) payable to aged spouse beneficiaries from 50 percent to 33 percent, 
phased in from 2000 to 2016.
This provision was included in all four plans developed by the Social Security 
Working Group of the NCRP. The current benefit structure of Social Security 
provides an inferior rate of return for two-earner couples relative to one-earner 
couples. The Commission reached the consensus that existing inequities in the 
program could be addressed by gradually scaling back the benefits in the 
traditional system that are paid to higher-income one-earner couples and by 
building additional benefits back into the system for those one-earner couples that 
most need it through other such measures as the NCRP’s minimum benefit 
provision.
Current Law
Under present law, aged spouses are eligible to receive a benefit equal to 50 
percent of their living spouse’s PIA, subject to a reduction for their age of 
retirement.
The Commission supported in principle a revised system of either benefit 
sharing or earning sharing for married couples that would give each member of the 
couple equal credit for Social Security taxes during periods in which they were 
married. The Commission was concerned by the inequity and inefficiency of the 
current system, which penalizes secondary earners and gives much lower lifetime 
benefits to couples if their earnings are split fairly evenly (for example, $25,000 
each) than if they are unevenly split (for example, $40,000 and $10,000, or 
$50,000 and 0). In the case of divorce, the current system also gives higher benefits 
to each of several spouses (and survivors) of a high-income worker than to any sole 
36 The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
spouse married to a middle- or low-income worker.
Unfortunately, however, the Commission was not able to find any data on the 
effects of alternative proposals so that it could determine whether its minimum 
benefit proposals, which were designed partly to help low-income widows and 
widowers, were adequate. Nor was the Commission able to determine just how 
much benefit formulas might have to be adjusted to reach various budget 
constraints. Therefore, it did not put forward any specific plan but expressed its 
view that this type of option should be considered as part of any final Social 
Security reform.
In addition, the Commission believes that a flat (or flatter) benefit payment for 
retired couples during retirement should be considered so as to provide greater 
benefits in old age, when poverty and the needs of widows and widowers are likely 
to rise. This provision interacts with earning sharing options, so, again, the 
Commission was not able to obtain estimates that would help to determine how to 
fit the proposal into the base package.
Increase Earnings Years Covered in the AIME Formula
to Reflect Longer Working Lives
The Commission recommends that, beginning in 2000, all years of earnings should 
be counted in the numerator of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
formula, and that the number of computation years in the AIME formula should be 
increased gradually from 35 to 40 years by adding 1 additional year every 2 years 
from 2001 to 2010.
The AIME formula should reflect the longer working lives associated with the 
ultimate increases proposed for the age of eligibility. The Commission also 
believed, however, that it was important to reward individuals for all the income 
they had earned, even if it had been on a part-time basis and even if it could not be 
included among their highest 40 years of lifetime earnings. The Plan proposes that 
all years of earnings be included in the AIME formula, although the number by 
which the total was to be divided should remain fixed regardless of how large that 
number of years turned out to be. The AIME formula no longer would be a true 
average of highest earnings years but would provide for additional retirement 
benefits according to every year of covered earnings, no matter how small the 
income in that particular year.
Current Law
In general, calculating Social Security benefits is a three-step process.
Step One: The Social Security Administration, using Social Security tax 
records, reconstructs the retiree’s wage history. Wages in prior years are indexed by 
national wage growth to reflect current value. The highest 35 years are selected, 
averaged, and then divided by 12 to obtain the worker’s AIME.
Step Two: Once AIME has been determined, it is plugged into the PIA 
formula, which is (note that the dollar amounts are indexed and adjusted annually 
based on the growth in nationwide average annual wages):
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 add 90 percent of the first $455 of AIME (which equals $5,460 annually);
 add 32 percent of AIME between $455 and $2,741; or
 add 15 percent of AIME above $2,741.
Step Three: The benefit is adjusted for the age at which the worker is first to 
receive the benefit (there also are other categories of benefit adjustments and 
recalculations).
Eliminate the Earnings Test Above the Normal Retirement Age
The Commission recommends eliminating the “earnings test,” partly because of 
the inducement it gives individuals to retire in order to collect some Social Security 
once they hit an eligible age.
The scoring of the Plan includes only the elimination of the earnings test after 
the normal retirement age, but retains the effective earnings test between the early 
and normal retirement age, which, under the agreement, eventually would involve 
a five-year span. Because the earnings test after the normal retirement age already 
does not apply after age 70, the long-term impact of this proposal, as currently 
estimated, would be minimal unless it addressed both types of earnings tests. The 
Commission was concerned that retaining the harsher of the two existing earnings 
tests would discourage people from working past the early retirement age.
The Commission believes in principle that the earnings test should be 
eliminated for all ages but recognized there were some additional scoring issues 
because its elimination would raise costs in the short run. On the other hand, such a 
reform actually could reduce long-term deficits if workers responded positively to 
these and other pro-work aspects of the Plan. The Commission recognized, 
however, that these changes still could require some modest adjustments in other 
parts of the proposal so as to strike a reasonable balance between short- and long-
term policy goals.
Redirect Social Security Benefit Taxation toward the Social Security 
Trust Fund
The most recent increase in Social Security benefit taxation was allocated to the 
Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. The Commission recommends 
gradually returning the income from this benefit taxation back to Social Security, 
phased in from 2010 to 2019.
This provision was included in all four plans developed by the Social Security 
Working Group of the NCRP. Although Medicare has more immediate solvency 
problems than Social Security does, the Commission believed it was undesirable to 
mix the revenues and outlays for Social Security with those from other programs, 
even including Medicare, when addressing the solvency of the Social Security 
system. In order to minimize the adverse impact on Medicare of the return of 
Social Security benefit taxes to the Social Security system, the Commission 
recommends gradually phasing in this provision over a period of 10 years.
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Adjust Early Retirement Benefits to Reflect Extra Taxes Paid Prior
to Retirement
The Commission recommends adjustments to the early retirement benefit level and 
the delayed retirement credit to reflect more accurately the value of extra taxes 
paid prior to retirement.
This element was included in each of the four proposals developed by the 
Social Security Working Group of the NCRP. Current law does not provide a fair 
deal in all cases for the retiree who waits until the normal retirement age to receive 
benefits, the actuarial value of which may not exceed early retirement benefits by 
enough to offset the value of extra taxes paid. The Commission believed Social 
Security benefits should not bias the decision regarding whether to retire early or 
late and thus proposes to adjust the ratio of early retirement benefits to normal 
retirement benefits to reflect the Social Security actuaries’ best estimate of the 
value of additional taxes paid. Consistent with this, the Social Security Working 
Group would increase the delayed retirement credit, too, to account for the value of 
additional taxes paid.
Add a “Fail-Safe” Mechanism
The Commission recommends that a “fail-safe” provision be included to prevent 
unexpected deterioration of Social Security’s projected soundness.
This provision also was included in all four plans developed by the Social 
Security Working Group of the NCRP. Unexpected developments, such as changes 
in fertility rates or life expectancies, have had—and will continue to have—an 
effect on projections of Social Security’s long-term actuarial solvency. The 
Commission believed that changes in the program should be required on a timely 
basis whenever projections showed deteriorating fiscal health in order to prevent 
delays that could lead to inequitable distribution of the burdens of change. The 
most appropriate application of this mechanism would be the alteration of the 
indexing of the eligibility ages after 2029, which could be varied when required in 
a gradual way in order to maximize both fairness and the time that beneficiaries 
have to adjust.
Adjust Bend Points
The Commission recommends that bend-point factors of 32 percent and 15 percent 
would be multiplied by a factor of 0.98 each year from 2001 to 2020.
This provision builds on a similar proposal included in the Social Security 
Advisory Council’s Individual Accounts (IA) Plan. As designed by the Social 
Security Working Group of the NCRP, this change reflects a belief, first, that the 
changes in the benefit level to accommodate the carve-out of an individual account 
should be confined to the top two bend points in order to minimize the impact on 
low-income retirees; second, that the change should be gradual, phased in by a 
factor of 2 percent per year, such that each succeeding birth cohort would have 
received an extra year of accumulation in its ISAs, effecting a gradual transition 
that would replace unfunded benefits with funded benefits; third, that the changes 
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should enable the traditional Social Security system to survive the retirement of the 
baby boom generation with a stable Trust Fund.
Current Law
The benefit formula, including the PIA bend points, is explained under the 
provision to count all years of earnings in the numerator of AIME.
The Commission undertook an extensive analysis of its Plan with the objective 
of achieving equitable treatment for individuals of different income levels, marital 
status, and birth cohorts. The Commission outlined the principal objective in such 
a way that all generations of beneficiaries would share the benefits and the burdens 
of the system fairly, and the reasonable expectations of those now nearing 
retirement would be honored.
The 1998 estimates of the Social Security trustees exhibit an improvement in 
the short-term financial status of the Social Security program relative to 1997 
estimates, although the program’s long-term fiscal problems remain essentially as 
before. This improvement creates the opportunity to make further refinements in 
the Plan that would improve rates of return and replacement rates for retirees early 
in the twenty-first century, especially those of the baby boom generation. The 
Commission expected that for subsequent generations of Americans, ISAs would 
provide a more significant portion of their Social Security income.
The NCRP believed that that the trustees’ 1998 reestimates permit further 
refinements to be made in the Plan on introducing legislation and strengthening the 
Plan by increasing the retirement income it provides to the baby boom generation. 
Several members of the Commission favored the option of delaying the effective 
date of increases in the early eligibility age. Another option was to delay the 
effective date of the Plan’s changes to the 32-percent bend-point factor. (On the 
congressional front, four Commission members—Judd Gregg [R–N.H.] and John 
Breaux [D–La.] in the Senate and Jim Kolbe [R–Ariz.] and Charles Stenholm
[D–Tex.] in the House of Representatives— introduced the Social Security reform 
portions of the Commission’s Plan [S. 2313 and H.R. 4256, respectively] during 
the 105th Congress.)
The Commission worked with the Social Security actuaries to produce a 
preliminary tentative estimate that shows the planned phase-in of changes in the 
32-percent bend-point factor could be delayed slightly without harming the 
stability of the Social Security system. Such a change would increase the 
replacement rates for near-term retirees in proportion to the number of years of 
delay. The exact schedule for changes to this bend point and to the early eligibility 
age should be considered in combination with the other, such that the whole would 
provide the fairest possible treatment of successive birth cohorts consistent with 
the overall objective of putting the Social Security system on a sustainable course 
for all future generations.
The Commission believed that further changes to the Plan could become 
necessary in order to reduce disparities in replacement rates among birth cohorts to 
the extent permitted by the 1998 reestimates. The NCRP further noted that some of 
the elements of the Plan as written actually could increase projected benefits 
because all the transition periods for benefit changes could not be coordinated fully 
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until the Commission had the opportunity to review actuarial estimates of their 
combined effect. This led to a small, but unintended, rise in replacement rates for a 
few cohorts. The NCRP therefore believed that it could become necessary to delay 
benefit-increasing provisions, such as repealing the earnings limit and counting all 
years of earnings in the AIME formula, so as to increase the likelihood that 
transitional benefit changes could be postponed further, and to promote equity 
among birth cohorts.
Employer-sponsored Private Pension and Personal 
Savings: Detailed Summary Description
Introduction to Detailed Description
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan reflects the mission of the NCRP for 
retirement savings: National retirement policy should contribute to long-term 
growth and economic prosperity. The Retirement Savings portion of the Plan, 
which includes private pension and personal savings initiatives, complements the 
Social Security portion to provide a comprehensive program to improve retirement 
security as a whole.
In the following pages are described the specific proposals included in the 
Commission’s Plan that would enhance the current system of private pensions and 
personal savings to provide additional retirement income above the floor of 
support provided by Social Security. These proposals would provide increased 
opportunities for savings, through both private pension and personal savings 
arrangements. In addition, they would simplify pension rules to provide 
understandable options. Portability of benefits would be improved. Most 
significantly, the proposals would modernize pension provisions to reflect changes 
in the workforce.
The detailed descriptions that follow not only provide more specificity about 
the operations of the proposals included in the Commission’s Plan, but also 
compare the proposals to present law and attempt to explain the reasons that the 
Commission decided to include them in its Plan. In addition, these descriptions are 
preceded by some background information on private pensions and personal 
savings to assist in understanding the detailed descriptions, particularly the 
technical terms of art.
Employer-sponsored Private Pension Savings Summary
Background
Private pension employer-sponsored savings arrangements are accomplished 
primarily through qualified plans—plans of deferred compensation that meet 
certain qualification standards of the Internal Revenue Code—that are accorded 
special tax treatment. Employees do not include qualified plan benefits in gross 
income until the benefits are distributed, even though the plan is funded and the 
benefits are nonforfeitable. The employer is entitled to a current deduction (within 
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limits) for contributions to a qualified plan even though the contributions are not 
included currently in an employee’s income. Contributions to a qualified plan are 
held in a tax-exempt trust.
Employees, as well as employers, may make contributions to a qualified plan. 
Subject to certain restrictions, employees may make both pre- and after-tax 
contributions to a qualified plan. Pretax employee contributions—for example, 
contributions to a qualified cash or deferred arrangement, a 401(k) plan53—are 
treated the same as employer contributions for tax purposes. Qualified plans can be 
established to provide for salary reduction contributions (“salary reduction plans”).
The tax treatment of contributions under qualified plans is essentially the same 
as that of deductible IRAs. The limits on contributions to qualified plans are much 
higher, however, than the IRA contribution limits so that qualified plans provide 
for a greater accumulation of funds on a tax-favored basis. The policy rationale for 
permitting greater accumulation under qualified plans than under IRAs is that the 
tax benefits for qualified plans encourage employers to provide benefits for a broad 
group of their employees. This reduces the need for public assistance and reduces 
pressure on the Social Security system.
The current qualification standards and related rules governing qualified plans 
are designed to ensure that qualified plans benefit an employer’s rank-and-file 
employees as well as its highly compensated employees. They also define the 
rights of plan participants and beneficiaries and provide limits on the tax benefits 
for qualified plans. A certain number of rules relating to qualified plans are 
designed to ensure that the amounts contributed to qualified plans are used for 
retirement purposes. Thus, for example, an early withdrawal tax applies to 
premature distributions from such plans and the ability to obtain distributions prior 
to the termination of employment from certain types of qualified plans is 
restricted.
Types of Qualified Plans
Qualified plans are classified into two broad categories, defined-benefit plans and 
defined-contribution plans, based on the nature of the benefits provided.
Under a defined-benefit pension plan, benefit levels are specified under a plan 
formula. For example, a defined-benefit pension plan might provide an annual 
retirement benefit of 2 percent of final average compensation multiplied by total 
years of service completed by an employee. Benefits under a defined-benefit 
pension plan are funded by the general assets of the trust established under the 
plan; individual accounts are not maintained for employees participating in the 
plan. Benefits under a defined-benefit pension plan are guaranteed (within limits) 
by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal corporation within 
the Department of Labor.
Benefits under defined-contribution plans are based solely on the contributions 
(and earnings thereon) allocated to separate accounts maintained for each plan 
participant. Profit-sharing plans and qualified cash or deferred arrangements—
53. Many qualified plans are described by the section of the Internal Revenue Code that 
establishes the plan—for example, 401(k), 403(b), and 457—and are described similarly herein.
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401(k) plans—are examples of defined-contribution plans.
The Commission’s Plan makes a number of changes to private pension 
employer-sponsored savings arrangements. These changes include:
 a universal 401(k) plan;
 improved defined-benefit plans;
 enhanced pension portability;
 increased savings opportunities;
 the modernization of pension provisions to reflect changes in the 
workforce;
 additional improvements; and
 other proposals.
Create a Universal 401(k) Plan
Current Law. Under current law, complex rules base eligibility for salary 
reduction–qualified plans on the type of employer. These different salary-reduction 
plans include 401(k) plans, which generally can be adopted by corporations and 
other for-profit organizations; 403(b) plans, which can be adopted by certain not-
for-profit organizations; and 457 plans, which can be adopted by state and local 
governments.
Commission’s Recommendation. Establish a single type of salary 
reduction–qualified retirement plan—a “universal 401(k) plan”—available to all 
employers, regardless of type. All types of employers could (but would not be 
required to) convert their existing 403(b) and 457 plans into 401(k) plans. The law 
would not be changed for 403(b) and 457 plans.
Rationale. Different types of salary reduction–qualified plans were developed at 
different times for different types of employers. Over time, the differences among 
these types of plans have diminished, but important differences remain. The 
Commission believed no good public policy explanations exist as to the reasons 
these differences should continue. The Commission’s review of Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) data and opinion surveys led it to the conclusion that confusion 
about different types of plans prevents employers from establishing retirement 
plans and employees from participating in plans or continuing to maintain their 
retirement savings in plans on job changes.
Improve Defined-Benefit Plans
Current Law. Under current law, complex funding and accrual rules apply to 
defined-benefit plans. In addition, pension portability has been difficult to achieve 
with defined-benefit plans because of their inability to transfer accrued benefits 
from one job to another without converting such benefits to a lump sum.
Small employers that wish to establish a tax-favored retirement savings plan 
without significant costs and complexity may establish a “simple” plan under 
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current law. A simple plan is a defined-contribution plan that can come in the form 
of a Simple IRA or Simple 401(k) plan. These simple plans are not subject to many 
of the rules applicable to qualified plans, but are subject only to minimal reporting 
and disclosure requirements. Currently no alternative to Simple plans is available 
for the small employer that seeks to provide its workers with a simplified, tax-
favored, defined-benefit plan.
Commission’s Recommendation. Establish a defined-benefit equivalent to 
the simple plan so that the small employer that prefers a defined-benefit alternative 
could create one on a cost-effective basis. The Simple Defined-Benefits Plan 
would have the following characteristics:
 Employer eligibility—Small businesses with 100 or fewer employees 
would be eligible, including professional service employers (for example, 
doctors, lawyers, and engineers). Employers, however, must not have had a 
defined-benefit or defined-contribution plan for the previous five years.
 Individual eligibility—All employees would be eligible if they had two 
years of prior service and were earning at least $5,000 in compensation in 
the current year.
 Vesting—All contributions would be 100-percent vested.
 Nondiscrimination rules and reporting requirements—Most 
nondiscrimination limitations and requirements would be waived.
 Minimum defined benefit and size of account—Each participant would 
have a separate account, as in a defined-contribution plan. The minimum 
defined benefit would have to equal 1 or 2 percent of compensation for that 
year. An employer could elect to increase that benefit to 3 percent of 
compensation for the first five years of the plan. All employees would have 
to receive the same level of benefits.
 Past service credit—There would be a five-year past service credit that 
would have to be funded over an equal number of years.
 Considered compensation—Current law would be followed; it states that 
the annual compensation limit that can be taken into account for qualified 
retirement plan purposes is $160,000 indexed.
 PBGC—There would be no required PBGC benefit.
 Termination—Because each participant’s benefit would be kept in a 
separate account, benefits would be fully portable because distribution of 
the separate account in a lump sum could not affect remaining participants 
adversely. On termination of employment, benefits could be transferred to 
an annuity or regular IRA; otherwise, they would become subject to an early 
distribution penalty tax of 20 percent.
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Rationale. From its review of IRS data and opinion surveys, the Commission 
concluded that defined-benefit plans are underutilized because of overly complex 
funding rules and portability obstacles. The number of defined-benefit plans in 
small and medium-sized employers has decreased substantially. The Commission 
believed a Simple Defined-Benefit Plan, in particular, would overcome these 
problems with its hybrid approach that would provide a level of guaranteed 
investment return while giving participants the benefit of possible additional 
return. Increased use of defined-benefit plans also could help the large numbers of 
baby boomers who have inadequate retirement savings and are running out of 
years to save.
Enhance Pension Portability
Current Law. Under current law, pension portability is not permitted between 
different types of plans (between 401(k) and 403(b) plans, for example). In 
addition, IRC–411(d)(6) prohibits transferee plans from accepting transfers from 
other plans without offering benefits, such as distribution options, peculiar to the 
transferor plan.
Commission’s Recommendation. Take action on the following 
recommendations from the Retirement Account Portability (RAP) Act of 1998 
(H.R. 3503), introduced by Representatives Earl Pomeroy (D–N.D.) and Kolbe.
 Section 457 plans. State and local government employees typically have 
access to a tax-deferred compensation plan called a 457 plan. Section 2 of 
RAP for the first time would allow these employees to roll over funds from 
their 457 plans into IRAs or into the retirement plans of their new employers 
when they switched jobs. Section 2 of RAP also would allow workers 
moving from the for-profit and nonprofit sectors into state and local 
government to roll over their retirement savings from their prior jobs into 
the section 457 plan available at their new state or local government 
workplace.
 Section 403(b) plans. Section 403(b) plans are tax-deferred retirement 
plans available to the employees of many nonprofit entities and public 
school systems. Section 2 of RAP for the first time would allow these 
employees to roll over funds from their 403(b) plans into the retirement plan 
of their new for-profit or state/local government employer when they 
switched jobs. Section 2 also would allow workers moving from a for-profit 
or state/local government job to a job that offers a 403(b) plan to roll over 
their retirement savings from their prior job into the 403(b) plan.
 No employer mandates. Even though RAP would remove the legal 
obstacles that have prevented rollovers in the situations described above, it 
contains no mandates that require employers to accept rollovers from their 
new employees. Thus, under RAP, a rollover would occur whenever the 
employee chose to move the money and whenever the employer agreed to 
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accept it.
 Expanded-conduit IRAs. Under current law, employees who switch jobs 
but cannot or do not roll over their retirement savings into a plan at a new 
workplace may place the money into a special IRA called a “conduit IRA.” 
So long as they do not add other contributions to this conduit IRA, the funds 
inside it can be rolled back into a workplace retirement plan at a later date. 
Under current law, however, a conduit IRA is severely limited with respect 
to the types of workplace retirement plan money it can accept and the types 
of workplace retirement plans into which its funds can be transferred later. 
Section 3 of RAP would correct this problem by allowing workers to move 
any kind of defined-contribution plan money into a conduit IRA and then 
allowing this money to be rolled back into any variety of defined-
contribution plan.
 Consolidation of deductible IRA contributions. Section 3 also would 
allow many individuals to consolidate their IRA funds and their workplace 
retirement savings in a single place. Under Section 3 of RAP, individuals 
who had IRAs and whose IRA contributions all had been tax deductible 
would have the opportunity to transfer funds from their IRAs into their 
workplace retirement plan—provided that the retirement plan trustee met 
the same high standards as an IRA trustee.
 Rollovers of after-tax contributions. Although pretax contributions to 
retirement plans are perhaps the most common form of employee 
contribution, many plans also allow participants to make after-tax 
contributions. Under current law, these after-tax contributions cannot be 
rolled over when employees switch jobs, meaning that workers face the 
confusing prospect of being able to roll over their pretax money but not their 
after-tax money. Section 4 of RAP would allow individuals for the first time 
to roll over their after-tax contributions to their new employer’s plan or to an 
IRA so long as the plan or IRA provider agreed to track and report the after-
tax portion of the rollover for the individual.
 Rationalization of the restrictions on distributions from defined-
contribution plans. Under current law, when a business is sold but an 
employee continues to work in the same role for the new employer, he can 
transfer much of his retirement money to the retirement plans of the new 
company. Under the “same-desk rule,” however, this transfer is not 
permitted for funds in such defined-contribution plans as 401(k)s, requiring 
the employee to leave the money in his former employer’s plan. Section 8 of 
RAP could repeal the same-desk rule so that the entire amount of a worker’s 
retirement funds could be transferred to the new employer’s plan after the 
corporate sale took place.
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 Transferee defined-contribution plans would not need to have the same 
distribution options as transferor defined-contribution plans. One 
barrier to portability under current law is that employees are restricted from 
transferring funds from a defined-contribution plan in which they used to 
participate to their new employer’s defined-contribution plan if the new plan 
does not have the same benefit options as the old plan. Under section 9 of 
RAP, employees and their spouses who wished to transfer their funds to the 
new employer’s plan could choose to do so even in cases in which the 
benefit options differed.
 Allowance for employers to disregard rollovers for purposes of cashout 
amounts. Under current law, employers are allowed to cash out the 
retirement benefits of departing employees when these benefits are valued 
at less than $5,000. This reduces the administrative burden that otherwise 
would be placed on employers by management of many small retirement 
plan accounts. Section 10 of RAP would make clear that, in determining 
whether employees’ benefit levels fall below the $5,000 cashout threshold, 
employers would not need to take into account any benefits that the 
employee had rolled over from a prior job. Thus, employers would need 
only to evaluate the ways in which retirement benefits earned at their own 
workplace compared with the $5,000 threshold. Without Section 10, 
employers might be reluctant to accept rollovers because they could be 
forced to maintain accounts even for workers who exceeded the $5,000 
threshold only by virtue of the money they had brought with them from a 
prior job.
 Purchase of service credits in governmental defined-benefit plans. 
Employees of state and local governments, particularly teachers, often 
move between states and school districts in the course of their careers. 
Under state law, these employees often have the option of purchasing 
service credits in their state defined-benefit pension plans in order to make 
up for time spent in another state or district. With purchase of these service 
credits, workers can earn a pension reflecting a full career of employment in 
the state in which they conclude their career. Under current law, these 
employees are not able to use the money they have saved in their 403(b) or 
457 defined-contribution plans to purchase these service credits and often 
lack other resources to use for this purpose. Under Section 10 of RAP, state 
and local government employees for the first time would be able to use 
funds from these retirement savings plans to purchase service credits and 
earn a full defined-benefit pension.
Rationale. Leakage of money out of retirement savings vehicles continues to 
present a barrier to adequate retirement income savings. This problem is 
particularly acute in cases in which individuals change jobs and are not permitted 
to carry over or consolidate their private pension employer-sponsored 
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arrangements. Although prior tax law changes significantly reduced leakage, 
barriers to pension portability still exist. All the changes described above will help 
to keep funds in the private pension system.
Increase Opportunities to Save
Give a Tax Credit to Small Employers. Current Law. An employer’s costs 
related to the establishment of a retirement plan (for example, payroll system 
changes, investment vehicle setup fees, consulting fees, and so forth) generally are 
deductible (and not creditable) as ordinary business expenses.
Commission’s Recommendation. Commission’s Plan would provide a tax 
credit to small employers that adopt an employer-sponsored retirement plan for the 
first time. As is the case in the Clinton administration’s legislative proposals for the 
fiscal year 1999 budget, the tax credit would be limited to 50 percent of up to 
$2,000 of administrative and retirement-education expenses in the first year of the 
plan and to 50 percent of up to $1,000 of such expenses in each of the second and 
third years.54
Rationale. The costs associated with plan startup, plan administration, and 
retirement education could pose a barrier to the establishment of new retirement 
programs, especially for smaller employers. Providing a tax credit for creating new 
plans could promote their adoption, not only by defraying some of these costs but 
also by providing a marketing tool for financial institutions or advisers to use in 
promoting new program adoption and by increasing awareness of retirement 
savings options.
Create a Catch-up Provision. Current Law. Under current law, taxpayers 
who are unemployed or choose to be out of the workforce to raise a family 
generally cannot contribute to retirement savings accounts in a qualified plan. 
Moreover, when these individuals rejoin the workforce, there is no ability to make 
up for missed retirement savings contributions.
Commission’s Recommendation. Commission’s Plan would allow 
individuals who had not been a participant under a qualified plan for the past five 
calendar years and with an income of less than $50,000 in the current year to 
contribute an additional $2,000 ($4,000 total) into their IRA or ISA for up to five 
years (that is, a total of $10,000 in additional contributions). These additional 
voluntary contributions would not be eligible for a tax credit or a matching 
contribution, respectively.
Rationale. The Plan would target the additional contribution limits more 
accurately at those who were most in need of the additional flexibility while 
providing an additional vehicle for such savings (for example, the ISA).
Repeal the 25-percent Compensation under Internal Revenue Code 
415(c)(1)(B). Current Law. Under current law, total employee contributions to a 
tax-qualified defined-contribution plan are limited to the lesser of 25 percent of 
compensation or $30,000.
54. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Revenue Proposals, February 1998.
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Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would repeal the 
25-percent limit.
Rationale. The 25-percent-of-compensation limit hinders middle-income 
Americans from making contributions up to the dollar limit in years in which they 
otherwise have the ability to do so. The 415(c) limit as currently structured 
provides a higher threshold of savings for higher-paid workers—the operative limit 
for higher-paid workers is $30,000. Eliminating the 25-percent limit would allow 
lower-paid workers to be subject similarly to the $30,000 limit only. This would 
help lower-paid women and others to save in a tax-preferred manner. Lifting the 
25-percent limit would not be a windfall for highly paid workers because the 
Internal Revenue Code contains other limitations that provide against abuse, such 
as nondiscrimination testing.
Modernize Pension Provisions to Reflect the Changing Nature
of the Workforce
Faster Vesting. Current Law. Under current law, employer matching 
contributions made by employers to defined-contribution plans must be either 100-
percent vested after five years or gradually vested in increments over seven years.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would reduce the 
minimum vesting requirements to provide that 100 percent of benefits be vested 
within three years or gradually vested in increments over six years.
Rationale. Considering the mobile nature of today’s workforce, there is the 
significant risk that many participants will leave employment before fully vesting 
in an employer’s matching contributions to a defined-contribution plan. One way 
to increase the portability of benefits for participants in defined-contribution 
plans—for example, 401(k) plans—is to require faster vesting for employer 
matching contributions.
Flexibility for Partial Retirement. Current Law. In general, individuals may 
access their pension benefits only through full retirement, death, disability, or 
separation of service.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would provide 
additional flexibility for individuals to access a portion of their accrued pension 
benefits when they are eligible for retirement but continue to work part-time for the 
same employer (for example, based on the early retirement age under the plan but 
no earlier than 59½).
Rationale. An increasing number of workers is easing out of the workforce 
through part-time employment instead of going from full-time employment to full-
time retirement. Giving individuals the opportunity to access a portion of their 
pension benefits would encourage continued part-time employment. This change 
would apply only to those working part-time for the same employer because a 
broader application could encourage individuals to retire early.
Additional Improvements for All Plans. Current Law. The government’s 
rules that apply to all plans, not just 401(k) plans, have become increasingly 
complex. In some cases, this complexity is misplaced. For example, employers are 
required to make unnecessary filings with the government but are not required to 
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provide periodic statements of benefits to participants. Plan participants are 
allowed to request only certain information regarding their accrued benefits once 
each year.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would simplify 
and rationalize existing rules applicable to all plans by
 requiring defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans to provide periodic 
benefit statements to plan participants; and
 allowing employers to take advantage of new technologies, such as the 
Internet, to meet various notice, consent, and similar requirements.
The Plan would require that participants in defined-benefit pension and 
defined-contribution savings plans periodically receive certain information 
concerning their individual accrued benefits under their benefits plan. Specifically, 
it would require that participants in defined-contribution plans be provided with a 
summary of their account balance and vesting status at least annually, and that 
participants in defined-benefit plans be provided with a summary of their accrued 
benefits and vested status every three years. Plan sponsors would receive the 
flexibility to provide the above information to inactive plan participants on request 
if they provided a summary of the same information at the time the participant 
separates from service. Plan sponsors also would receive the flexibility to meet this 
requirement either through electronic or nonelectronic forms of communication.
Rationale. The Commission believed that, as a general rule, complexity 
hinders pension plan coverage and retirement income adequacy. As a result, the 
Commission concluded that reporting and disclosure rules should be focused more 
acutely on educating plan participants and using the latest available technology to 
do so in order to increase pension coverage and enable participants to achieve 
increased retirement income adequacy.
Most defined-contribution plans—especially those with participant-directed 
investments—provide information regarding the participant’s accrued benefits at 
least annually, either in writing or through electronic access. Defined-contribution 
plans are not required to provide this service, however, and not all plans do. 
Accrued benefit information is the most important information a participant can 
receive. Receiving this information can help to assure the accuracy and integrity of 
the plan’s records and facilitate retirement planning by plan participants.
Many defined-benefit plans, especially multiemployer plans, never provide 
accrued benefit information to a plan participant until he applies for a benefit. 
Participants in these plans should be provided with selected accrued benefit 
information at least every three years in order to help assure the integrity of the 
plan’s records and to assist them in their efforts to plan their retirement.
Other Proposals
Revise Current IRS Tax Qualification Sanctions. Current Law. The IRS 
has the ability to disqualify a plan for violations of the operational requirements 
applicable to qualified retirement and savings plans. The IRS also has broad 
discretion as to the point at which to disqualify a plan and the related trust. 
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Although actual disqualification is rare, the IRS typically uses the economic 
sanctions that could occur on disqualification as a factor in determining the 
appropriate penalty.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would revise the 
sanctions available to the IRS for violations of the operational requirements 
applicable to qualified retirement and savings plans as follows:
 No economic sanction would be imposed if the violation had been fully 
corrected prior to any related IRS audit;
 The IRS would receive the ability to impose a sanction of up to 20 percent 
of the actual damage amount for violations that it had discovered and that 
the sponsor had corrected within agreed-on time frames. The IRS would be 
able to impose a sanction of up to 100 percent of the actual damage amount 
if the sponsor had failed to correct the violations within the agreed-on time 
frame; and
 The IRS would be allowed to disqualify a plan or trust in cases in which the 
sponsor had engaged in known, material, and recurring violations of the tax 
qualification requirements.
Rationale. Although the IRS has promulgated a number of voluntary 
compliance programs over the past several years, a revision of the sanctions 
associated with tax qualifications issues is appropriate to provide reasonable 
deterrents to abuse and additional consistency in enforcement actions while 
avoiding excessive fines or discretion on behalf of the IRS. The proposed sanction 
approach is generally consistent with the sanctions provided to the Department of 
Labor in connection with fiduciary breaches and the IRS in connection with 
prohibited transactions.
Strengthen the Antialienation Provisions Associated
with Qualified Retirement and Savings Plans. Current Law. Participant 
benefits under qualified pension and savings plans are provided certain protections 
against antialienation.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would provide for 
total protection of accrued benefits under qualified plans except in cases of 
fiduciary breaches by a fiduciary who has accrued benefits under the plan that was 
the subject of the breach. This provision would not serve to prevent the proper 
splitting of pension assets in connection with a divorce.
Rationale. Providing strong protection for pension assets would serve to 
encourage savings through qualified plans within applicable limits.
Preservation of Retirement Assets for Retirement. Current Law. Current 
law does not encourage or require employer and employee contributions to be 
preserved for retirement purposes only.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan would change 
current law to require that certain employer contributions and a certain percentage 
of employee contributions be preserved for retirement, death, or permanent 
disability. The specific proposals would require that
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 non-deminimis distributions related to employer contributions be rolled 
over and preserved until retirement (possibly at age 59½), death, or 
permanent disability; and
 a stated percentage (for example, 50 percent) of employee deferrals be 
preserved until retirement, death, or permanent disability. As to the 
remaining percentage (for example, the other 50 percent), the proposal 
would drop the excise tax on early distributions and allow loans without 
triggering any tax consequences.
Rationale. Current law does not ensure that retirement savings are used for 
retirement purposes. Requiring that certain employer contributions and a certain 
percentage of employee contributions be preserved for retirement, death, or 
permanent disability would guarantee that at least a portion of both employer and 
employee contributions to retirement plans are available at the time when needed.
Personal Savings Summary: Broad Simplification of IRAs
Simplify IRAs
Current Law. Americans who meet certain Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) 
qualifications can save personally through contributions to deductible IRAs and 
Roth IRAs. These AGI limitations are not uniform, and this lack of uniformity 
causes great complexity and confusion. Americans who do not meet these limits 
can save through contributions to nondeductible IRAs.
 Deductible IRAs: Currently, an individual may make deductible 
contributions to an IRA up to the lesser of $2,000 or his compensation if he 
is not an active participant in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. In the 
case of a married couple, deductible IRA contributions of up to $2,000 can 
be made for each spouse (including, for example, a homemaker who does 
not work outside the home) if the combined compensation of both spouses 
is at least equal to the contributed amount.
If the individual (or his spouse) is an active participant in an employer-
sponsored retirement plan, the $2,000 deduction limit is phased out for tax-
payers with AGI over certain levels for the taxable year.
The phaseout limits for a single individual who is an active participant 
in an employer-sponsored retirement plan are as follows: for 1998, $30,000 
to $40,000; for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, the limits increase by $1,000 
each year until they are, by 2002, $34,000 to $44,000; for 2003, $40,000 to 
$50,000; for 2004, $45,000 to $55,000; and for 2005 and thereafter, 
$50,000 to $60,000.
The phaseout limits for a married individual filing a joint return who is 
an active participant in an employer-sponsored plan are as follows: for 
1998, $50,000 to $60,000; for 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002, the limits 
52 The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
increase by $1,000 each year, so that the limits by 2002 are $54,000 to 
$64,000; for 2003, $60,000 to $70,000; for 2004, $65,000 to $75,000; for 
2005, $70,000 to $80,000; for 2006, $75,000 to $85,000; and for 2007 and 
thereafter, $80,000 to $90,000.
In the case of a married taxpayer filing a separate return, the deduction 
is phased out between $0 and $10,000 of AGI. The maximum deductible 
IRA contribution for an individual who is not an active participant but 
whose spouse is an active participant is phased out for taxpayers with AGI 
between $150,000 and $160,000.
 Roth IRAs: For years beginning in 1998, individuals with AGI below 
certain levels may make nondeductible contributions to a Roth IRA. The 
maximum annual contribution that can be made to a Roth IRA is the lesser 
of $2,000 or the individual’s compensation for the year. The contribution 
limit is reduced to the extent that an individual makes contributions to any 
other IRA in the same taxable year. As under the rules relating to IRAs 
generally, a contribution of up to $2,000 for each spouse may be made to a 
Roth IRA, provided that the combined compensation of the spouses is at 
least equal to the contributed amount. The maximum annual contribution 
that can be made to a Roth IRA is phased out for single individuals with 
AGI between $95,000 and $110,000 and for joint filers with AGI between 
$150,000 and $160,000.
 Nondeductible IRAs: To the extent that an individual cannot or does not 
make deductible contributions to an IRA or contributions to a Roth IRA, the 
individual can make nondeductible contributions to an IRA.
Commission’s Recommendation. The Commission’s Plan sets a universal 
AGI limit for all IRAs (except the nondeductible IRA). The Plan does not specify 
the dollar amount at which income limits should be set until a cost estimate is done 
because revenue effects for various alternatives were not obtainable. The 
Commission anticipates, however, that universal limits would be achieved by 
phasing up the traditional IRA income limits to mirror the Roth IRA income limits. 
In addition, the $2,000 contribution limit would be indexed.
Rationale. From its review of IRS data and opinion surveys, the Commission saw 
that complexity and resulting confusion among Americans will keep IRA 
utilization low, despite the clear desire of Congress and the Clinton administration 
to expand their usage. Since restrictions were placed on IRA eligibility in 1986, the 
level of IRA usage has dropped from 17 percent to 7 percent. Although the Roth 
IRA increased IRA usage in 1998, confusion about eligibility remains a barrier to 
IRA utilization, and IRA usage has dropped at all income levels. Although the 
Commission endorsed simplification of IRAs, it did not believe IRAs are intended 
to replace the current employer-sponsored retirement plans. The multiple “pillars” 
(private savings, Social Security, and employer-sponsored plans) that provide for 
retirement security should be retained and strengthened.
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Social Security: Assumptions
The Plan assumes the implementation of reforms to the consumer price index 
(CPI) that will reduce it by 0.5 percent below projections in the 1997 Annual 
Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has 
made several improvements in the calculation of the CPI to address previous 
overstatement, and continues to make adjustments. The BLS already has 
announced changes that will result in a reduction of 0.17 percent in the CPI lower-
level substitution bias by implementing a geometric mean aggregation procedure 
in most categories. The Commission believed the BLS can make additional 
improvements in the accuracy of the CPI, particularly in the area of upper-level 
substitution bias, that would result in a reduction of at least an additional 0.33 
percent in the CPI necessary to meet the 0.5 percent assumption. The Commission 
supported the efforts of Congress and the Clinton administration to encourage the 
BLS to continue to improve the CPI and to provide the BLS with the necessary 
resources and authority to do so.
For purposes of scoring the increases in the normal retirement age and the early 
eligibility age, each is presumed to increase by two months every three years after 
2029.
The Commission was careful to provide for minimal changes for those 
expecting to retire soon while, at the same time, beginning to build up some 
savings for those who were younger. The proposal, as modeled by the actuaries, 
would establish individual savings accounts only for individuals younger than 55 
when the provisions became effective. Consequently, the danger would arise of 
differential treatment of a worker aged 54 years and 11 months relative to a worker 
aged 55. Lacking the resources to rescore several different methods of avoiding the 
creation of a benefit “notch,” the Commission acknowledged that an adjustment 
could be required here, but it also noted that any adjustment in the availability of a 
private account would require simultaneously some adjustment in the speed at 
which benefit changes were made to provide for the fairest possible treatment of 
subsequent birth cohorts.
The Impact on the Unified Federal Budget
The Commission believed its Plan would have a significant positive impact by 
reducing the long-term debt of the federal government by addressing the unfunded 
long-term liabilities of the Social Security Trust Fund. The Commission became 
certain that the long-term benefits clearly justified the modest short-term deficits in 
the unified budget to fund the transition costs of a reform plan. Improved budget 
projections suggest, however, that this Plan could be enacted without requiring an 
increase in federal borrowing from the public.
The Commission considered it essential for Congress to preserve the 
opportunity to enact Social Security reform with minimal impact on the short-term 
borrowing from the public by restraining itself from “spending the surplus” in 
other ways until it had the chance to evaluate the extent to which a unified budget 
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could help to offset the transition costs of its Plan. A critical opportunity to reform 
and strengthen Social Security, and to reduce the long-term debt obligations of the 
federal government, would be lost if Congress acted hastily to reduce or eliminate 
projected unified federal budget surpluses before acting on Social Security reform.
Social Security: Administering and Regulating Individual 
Security Accounts
The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan assumes a design of individual security 
accounts that is analogous to the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) provided to federal 
retirees.
Administrative concerns argue strongly for working within the current payroll 
tax collection structure to direct contributions on behalf of covered workers into 
ISAs. Currently, employers typically pay payroll taxes on behalf of each employee 
on a biweekly basis and report total contributions to the Social Security 
Administration at the end of each year. To minimize costs, the Commission’s Plan 
assumes that the responsibilities of employers should remain roughly the same as 
under current law. The NCRP recommends that the burden of record-keeping for 
each individual be assumed by a bureau within the Social Security Administration 
created for and dedicated to this purpose, with the administrative costs distributed 
proportionally among ISAs. This Plan assumes administrative costs of 10 basis 
points for such a system, based on estimates provided by the Social Security 
actuaries. The Commission recognized that some financing would be needed and 
amortized over a 20-year period because there would be startup costs and the ISA 
would not reach a size to achieve the economies of scale contemplated for a 
number of years. The Plan would provide for legislative enactment in 1999 and 
implementation of the ISAs one year after the date of enactment. The Commission 
also recognized, however, that the establishment of ISAs would present significant 
administrative challenges, and that the timeframe for implementing ISAs must be 
conditioned on administrative feasibility.
Minimizing employer burdens are but one reason for adopting a TSP-style 
structure. Because of the small balances that would exist within the accounts of 
low-income employees, it is essential that administrative costs not be of a size to 
destroy an individual’s capacity to receive a positive net rate of return from his 
investment. A decentralized mechanism in which low-income individuals were 
obliged to set up their accounts privately and individually as with IRA accounts 
would be likely to result in higher administrative costs.
Investment choices for these ISAs would be provided in a manner similar to the 
existing TSP. Investors could choose among such broad-based funds as, for 
example, stock index funds based on the Wilshire 5000 or the Standard & Poor’s 
500; a bond index fund; a blended index fund that includes both stocks and bonds; 
and a government securities fund. Wage-earners under 45 years of age who failed 
to specify an investment fund at the startup of the ISA regime would be provided a 
standard blend of 50 percent U.S. Treasury bonds and 50 percent Standard & 
Poor’s 500 Index equities. Those 45 years and older at the startup of the ISA 
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regime would be placed into the treasury bond option. The bond option for those 
entering over age 45 would be phased out over a 20-year period. After about 2020, 
the blended option would become the only standard option.
The Commission envisions that after a few years an increased number of 
investment options would be provided to beneficiaries. For each type of portfolio, 
investors would have the choice between various government-approved companies 
to manage the funds within the TSP model. Firms would bid competitively for the 
right to manage these funds, with an eye toward minimizing administrative costs.
Once the system became operational, the Commission recommends that 
additional voluntary contributions be permitted to ISAs and that Congress consider 
providing incentives to enable individuals of all income levels to benefit from this 
option. Congress also should consider, once the system had matured to the point at 
which administrative costs became predictable and manageable, allowing rollover 
contributions from these personal accounts into ISAs so long as they featured the 
same withdrawal rules as the ISAs, provided that these accounts were invested in 
broadly diversified accounts with low administrative costs.
Individual funds would be fully
 
vested, and an individual would have a non-
forfeitable property right in contributions to his account and in earnings accrued. 
No access would be allowed to the account until retirement, and even then only 
within the guidelines prescribed by the program’s rollover and distribution rules. 
Record-keeping for ISAs must be explicit and make clear to individuals that 
earnings posted to their accounts are direct market earnings, net of administrative 
expense, from direct investment of pooled account assets in financial instruments.
The fund managers would have the fiduciary responsibility for standards of 
management and investment of assets. The fiduciary provisions should recognize 
an “exclusive benefit” rule, which would assure each wage-earner that account 
contributions could be used only for the purpose of providing retirement savings 
for that individual: the government would have no ability to utilize account 
contributions or earnings. In addition, the Commission recommends the creation of 
a comprehensive regulatory program for the oversight of asset managers, allowing 
for a reasonable self-regulation by the investment industry.
Social Security is intended as a safety net that provides a retiree with a monthly 
income for as long as he lives. ISAs should not change the basic nature of the 
system. Combined with traditional Social Security, these accounts should provide 
a retiree with income security for the rest of his life.
The Commission opposed withdrawal rules, such as preretirement or lump-
sum distributions, that would expose individual beneficiaries to increased risk of 
poverty, relative to protections that would have existed had ISAs not been 
established. Therefore, the Plan prohibits preretirement withdrawals other than for 
death or disability.
On retirement, individuals would be required to annuitize that portion of their 
ISA balances that, when added to their traditional Social Security benefit, were 
necessary to provide an income comfortably above the poverty level. Individuals 
would be able to choose between a number of annuity plans that reflected the life 
needs of the individual. Individuals would not be required to withdraw non-
annuitized balances on retirement.
56 The 21st Century Retirement Security Plan
The annuities would be similar to those required to be offered to plan 
participants under qualified defined-benefit plans subject to the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and would be indexed for inflation. 
Under ERISA, if the retiree is married, the normal benefit form is a joint and 
survivor annuity. In order to assure that the monthly payments kept pace with 
increases in the cost of living, the annuities could be adjusted for inflation 
annually, perhaps through the use of the treasury indexed bonds. Individuals would 
be able to choose from a group of insurance companies that had been selected in a 
competitive bidding process for the right to manage these accounts. A government-
provided standard option would be available as well.
Concerns about shorter life expectancies among the poor could be addressed 
by requiring either a life annuity, period certain (income for life is promised but a 
minimum number of payments is guaranteed) or a refund annuity (monthly 
payments continue after death until the combined benefits have equaled the 
purchase price of the annuity).
Social Security: Three Additional Reform Plans
The Social Security Working Group of the NCRP developed four plans that would 
meet the criteria for Social Security reform established by the Commission. The 
other three include the following.
“Defined Benefit Plan”
This plan would balance the traditional Social Security program and preserve its 
defined-benefit character but would not include a personal defined-contribution 
account. It also would:
 raise the normal retirement age to 70 by 2029, the early retirement age to 65 
by 2017, and index both after 2029 in order to maintain expected years of 
retirement at an approximately constant level;
 cover all state and local government employees hired after 1999;
 reduce the percentage of PIA payable to aged spouse beneficiaries from 50 
percent to 33 percent (phased in from 2000 to 2016);
 beginning in 2000, count all years of earnings in the numerator of AIME;
 eliminate the earnings test;
 credit all revenue from the taxation of benefits to OASDI (phase revenue 
from HI to OASDI between 2010 and 2019);
 include lost tax revenues in actuarial adjustment for early/late retirement;
 create a “fail-safe” mechanism to protect the program against variations 
from assumptions; and
 institute a minimum benefit provision to begin in full in 2010, with initial 
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benefit protection wage-indexed thereafter.
“Defined Benefit–Plus” Plan
Provisions are the same as in the defined-benefit plan, except that an “add-on” 
personal account would be established with contributions above the 12.4 percent 
payroll tax rate. For purposes of illustration, the account is assumed to be a 
mandated savings account of size equal to 2 percent of taxable payroll.
“ISA-Plus” Plan
Provisions to balance the traditional Social Security system are identical to the 21st 
Century Retirement Security Plan, except that the payroll tax refund into personal 
accounts would apply only to individuals under age 55, and an additional 
contribution of 2 percent would be required so that the personal accounts be 
funded at a level of 4 percent of taxable payroll.
Social Security: Why This Plan Among
the Four Alternatives?
Each of the four plans developed by the Social Security Working Group of the 
NCRP achieves the goals developed by the Commission for reform of the Social 
Security program.
The Commission considered the approach taken in the 21st Century 
Retirement Security Plan as the best choice on the grounds both of policy and of 
political feasibility. The arguments for selecting the plan over the defined-benefit 
proposal could be summarized as follows:
1. The Plan, due to the inclusion of a personal account, would improve rates of 
return and therefore increase retirement income for most beneficiaries, relative 
to a package of purely traditional solutions.
2. The Plan would fund in advance a portion of the future liabilities of the Social 
Security system and thus place a smaller tax burden on the future economy 
than the defined-benefit plan, increasing the flexibility for future Americans to 
address other national needs or crises.
3. The Plan simultaneously would improve returns for beneficiaries and reduce 
long-term federal liabilities in principal and interest to the Social Security 
Trust Fund, relative to a purely defined-benefit solution.
Finally, the leading argument in favor of a defined-benefit solution over a 
personal account solution has been much diminished in force in recent times due to 
improved projections for the federal unified budget balance. Current budget 
predictions indicate that the federal government could create accounts equal to 2 
percent of national taxable payroll without incurring a unified budget deficit. This 
would create the opportunity that the chairs believe should be seized to limit future 
federal liabilities that could not be accomplished if the federal government 
continued to invest surplus OASDI revenues in treasury securities.
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The chairs noted that it is possible to produce a rate of return for beneficiaries 
that is higher than the Plan would provide, providing that additional contributions 
be required as in the “Defined Benefit–Plus” or “ISA-Plus” plans. It was the 
judgment of the chairs, however, that requiring such an additional contribution 
would be tantamount to a tax increase, and that allowing additional voluntary 
contributions, therefore, would provide the best way to maximize individual rates 
of return. The chairs urged that all proposals be viewed not in isolation, but in the 
context of other pressing national needs, including the necessity of devoting 
additional funding to Medicare and to private retirement systems. Consequently, 
the Commission believed the Plan, as drafted, represents the best choice because it 
achieves the Commission’s stated objectives without an effective increase in 
taxation.
Social Security: An Explanation of Distributional Effects
One additional reason for supporting the 21st Century Retirement Security Plan 
over the alternatives is the greater degree of progressivity that it would achieve. 
The most significant reason for this effect is the progressive method of changing 
the PIA formula to carve out the 2 percent of payroll to be refunded into personal 
accounts.
The Social Security actuaries, in projecting intermediate rates of return for the 
ISAs, used the blended portfolio described on page 171 of the report of the Social 
Security Advisory Council. It should be noted, however, that the improved rate of 
return for low-income individuals under the Plan, relative to the traditional 
defined-benefit solution, would be sufficiently greater to allow low-income 
individuals still to fare better even if these intermediate rates of return from 
personal accounts were not achieved.
The rates of return for younger average-income beneficiaries and upper-
income beneficiaries, too, would be superior under the Plan relative to a defined-
benefit solution. For older workers, however, an effect could come into play at this 
point that also was present in the analysis of the Social Security Advisory 
Council’s plans. The actuaries’ figures incorporate the effect of PIA changes on 
disability benefits, and it is not possible in reviewing undifferentiated return rates 
to see the different effects on the retirement and disability portions of Social 
Security separately. Tables that separate replacement rates for the two categories 
reveal that the Plan would fare better across most birth years when considering the 
retirement portion only. The Commission was not charged with making 
recommendations for Social Security disability policy; and the chairs believed the 
effects of all such PIA changes on disability benefits would need to be noted 
frankly; and that legislative implementation of this Plan should not apply such PIA 
changes to the disability program without further study.
The progressivity achieved by the 21st Century Retirement Security Plan 
would mean that, to a significant extent, low-income workers would be shielded 
successfully from the adverse effects of benefit changes made to carve out an ISA 
of 2 percent. The chairs believed that the focus of benefit restraints on high-income 
individuals underscores the desirability of permitting additional voluntary 
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contributions to these accounts. If these were permitted, low-income workers 
would have received an improved rate of return through the means of added 
progressivity in the traditional benefit formula, while average- to high-income 
workers would be able to increase their net rates of return through voluntary 
contributions. The unequal abilities of individuals of different income levels to 
take advantage of voluntary contributions is the chief reason that adding 
progressivity to the OASDI program is essential.
Illustrative examples reveal how the importance of the ISA portion would grow 
with time. The average single worker retiring at age 65 in 2030 would do notably 
better under the Commission’s Plan, assuming intermediate rates of return, than 
under a traditional defined-benefit solution. If the worker chose to make additional 
voluntary contributions to the individual account, his advantage would increase. 
The worker retiring at age 67 in 2060, however, would receive fully 38 percent 
more under the Plan than under a traditional solution, again before counting the 
effects of voluntary contributions.
It should be noted, too, that these distributional effects in some respects 
understate the income to be provided under the Plan because each of the workers 
depicted would have been subject to some reduction in benefits due to not having 
reached normal retirement age as defined by the Plan. All four plans considered by 
the Commission would decrease the percentage of PIA received in early retirement 
and increase the delayed retirement credit. Thus, individuals retiring at normal 
retirement age or later would receive greater income than depicted in these 
examples.
In the long run, the impact of the Plan would be positive for the unified budget 
relative to current law. The Commission considered a worst-case scenario for 
short-term costs, assuming that the federal government simply would add the cost 
of the Social Security transition to federal borrowing and enact no offsetting 
measures. The additional borrowing and interest payments that would result from 
such a policy were included in the Commission’s estimate that annual transition 
costs would drop to zero by 2017. If any offsets were enacted, the transition would 
have a positive effect earlier than this.
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A P P E N D I X  B
Additional Views
Congressional Cochairs
The recommendations in this report do not reflect the individual policy preferences 
of any one member of the Commission. We are greatly pleased that, despite the 
enormous diversity of viewpoints, members unanimously chose to set an example 
of bipartisan compromise instead of electing to emphasize areas of specific 
disagreement.
Unlike other commissions in which differences sharpen and positions harden 
as the discussion progresses, the sincere airing of legitimate concerns led each 
member of the NCRP to move beyond individually held opinions and toward a 
middle ground between ideological poles. As Congress confronts the multitude of 
issues in retirement policy reform, it will need to muster a comparable willingness 
to turn disparate opinions into unified recommendations.
The accompanying “additional views” are an important component of the Final 
Report of the National Commission on Retirement Policy. We believe that many 
members of the Commission would not have voted to support its unified 
recommendations had it not been for the fact that each member knew he would be 
permitted to file separate views.
The congressional cochairs are among the Commission members who agreed 
to compromise on personally held policy preferences in the interest of securing 
agreement. Such issues ranged from the opportunity to “roll over” ISA balances, to 
efforts to add progressive elements to ISAs and IRAs, to many others.
The Commission sought to expand the discussion regarding Social Security 
reform by considering new ideas that previously had not been analyzed fully and 
adequately. During the Commission’s deliberations, many such innovative and 
interesting ideas were discussed. Some of these proposals, such as the minimum 
benefit provision, were included in the Plan once commissioners were satisfied by 
the level of analysis that had been completed. Many other ideas discussed by 
Commission members could not be included in the Plan, however, because the 
Commission was not able to obtain data on the fiscal implications of the 
provisions; nor was it able to answer technical concerns about the way in which 
these proposals would be implemented. Many of these ideas are presented in the 
additional views submitted by Commission members.
Although the Commission as a whole did not endorse these proposals, it does 
believe that such innovative options as those described in the additional views 
should be considered part of any final Social Security reform legislation that 
achieves the objectives outlined by the Commission.
National Commission on Retirement Policy 61
It is important to remember that a comprehensive package of reform cannot 
remain viable after naïve substitutions of certain provisions for others. For 
example, the Social Security recommendations here simultaneously achieve the 
goals of actuarial solvency, stable annual cash-flow, targeted progressivity, and 
comparable treatment of successive birth cohorts. Eliminating one provision and 
replacing it with another that may provide an equal contribution to actuarial 
balance could interfere with the smoothness of annual cash flow and with 
distributive goals. Accordingly, policy considerations, as much as the spirit of 
compromise, favor the report of a comprehensive package as opposed to a menu of 
options, each with separate levels of support.
We trust that the additional views will be read in light of the Commission’s 
success in achieving unanimity, and as an example of the diversity of concerns that 
must be melded if Congress is to enact comprehensive retirement policy reform.
Warren Batts
I was pleased to serve as a member of the NCRP. I believe its work and its 
bipartisan character represent the most significant advancement thus far in the 
continuing debate over the future of the Social Security retirement system.
One aspect of the work of the NCRP deserves special attention.
The Commission reached a unanimous conclusion, but only after vigorous 
debate among its members. Unanimity did not come easily, but only because the 
Commission members with strongly held, differing viewpoints were willing to 
subordinate individual opinion to collective judgment.
Further, I wish to point out, in particular, two aspects of the NCRP 
recommendations.
First, changes advocated by the Commission are responsive to the simple 
reality that the U.S. economy cannot remain vigorous without reform of the Social 
Security system. Moreover, reform would allow individuals and families to grow 
with an expanding economy, and to increase the well-being and independence to 
which all Americans are entitled.
Second, the recommendations of the NCRP concerning personal retirement 
accounts are unequivocally congruent with the protection that federal law provides 
individuals who participate in employer-sponsored retirement plans. To this effect, 
account assets remain the property of each individual and are not forfeitable; the 
assets are managed and invested subject to rules for fiduciaries and for the 
exclusive purpose of providing the individual with retirement income. Stated more 
simply: the money in the account belongs to the individual who earned it, to be 
invested and managed accordingly.
William A. Galston
The NCRP’s Plan represents an important point of departure for what I hope will 
be a sober and searching debate about the best way to provide a decent and secure 
retirement for elderly Americans in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, the Plan 
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can be improved in some respects. For example:
 Instead of raising the early retirement age in tandem with the normal 
retirement age, I believe it would be preferable to retain the early retirement 
age specified in current law while adjusting the monthly payments received 
by early retirees to eliminate subsidies for early retirement as measured 
actuarially relative to normal retirement. This would help to ease the burden 
on demographic groups that experience lower-than-average life expectancy 
while maintaining the fiscal integrity of the overall system.
 The principle of honoring legitimate expectations is an important element 
of our moral understanding. This principle has special force as applied to 
individuals who cannot adjust easily to unexpected changes in those 
expectations—in the case of Social Security, individuals at or near 
retirement age. For this reason, I believe the effective dates of the relevant 
provisions of the NCRP’s Plan should be adjusted so that individuals 55 or 
older as of the date of enactment would be held harmless relative to their 
expectations under current law.
 In addition, I believe it is crucial to stress important features of the NCRP’s 
Plan that may be overlooked amid the controversy over our highest-profile 
recommendations.
 The Plan would adopt a more stringent and prudent definition of solvency 
than specified in current law—a stable trust fund ratio in perpetuity rather 
than balance over a 75-year cycle. This change would improve the odds that 
future generations would be able to rely on the expectations generated by 
the system.
 The new minimum benefit—60 percent of poverty for individuals who have 
worked for 20 years, rising by 2 percent per year to 100 percent for those 
with 40 years of work—would enhance significantly the progressivity of the 
system.
 Taken together, the various provisions of the Plan would generate increased 
benefits relative to current policy for low-income workers—even those who 
had adopted risk-averse, lower-yield investment strategies for their personal 
accounts.
 We dealt thoughtfully and responsibly with such issues as administrative 
costs and mandatory annuitization of personal accounts.
Estelle James
I strongly support the major thrust of the Commission’s recommendations because 
I believe they are in the interests of the elderly as well as of the broader economy. I 
would like to add the following four caveats and tradeoffs, however:
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1. There is the danger that the baby boom generation will suffer cuts in benefits 
while future generations will gain if the bend-point factors are cut faster than 
the buildup of the individual accounts. In my opinion, the timing of bend-point 
factor changes should be set to avoid this intergenerational redistribution 
because it does not appear warranted on the grounds of efficiency or equity. If 
we want to avoid deficit finance, this transition cost may require a small 
interim increase in contributions.
2. It is possible that, as an outcome of the political process, the early retirement 
age will remain lower than we recommend. In that case, I believe that 
actuarially fair reductions in benefits are essential. But this may result in the 
benefits for many early retirees falling below the poverty line. If we want to 
permit early retirement and we also want to prevent poverty in old age, the 
price again may be a small increase in contributions.
3. On average, the individual accounts should raise benefits and rates of return on 
Social Security contributions (assuming future financial market returns 
resemble past returns), but for some periods and individuals this may not be the 
case, considering the variability in stock market returns. To avoid low benefits 
for some cohorts and individuals, it may be desirable to aim at slightly higher 
average benefits—and this, too, would require slightly higher contributions.
4. The low allocation to the individual accounts (only two percentage points, or 
about $500 per year for the average worker) may lead many workers to 
conclude it is not worth their time and effort to think carefully about ways to 
invest the money. But a larger allocation may require higher contributions, if 
we wish to keep the social safety net provided by the remaining defined-benefit 
plan.
The above caveats suggest that—depending on benefit projections and early 
retirement age—somewhat higher contributions may be in order, especially in the 
short run. In considering this possibility, we should bear in mind that benefit and 
contribution rates in the United States are low compared to those in other 
industrialized countries. If we decided to move in this direction, my preference 
would be to keep the contribution rate unchanged but to raise the ceiling on taxable 
earnings, thereby increasing aggregate contributions while making the system 
more progressive. This would allow us to slow down the change in bend-point 
factors, to increase the benefit rate for everyone including early retirees, and (after, 
say, 2005) to allocate an additional percentage point to the individual accounts. If 
the returns on the individual accounts are sufficiently high, the contribution rate 
could be reduced in the future.
Beth Kobliner
A great deal of attention has been paid to polls that suggest young people do not 
believe that Social Security will provide for them as it has for their parents and 
grandparents. One main advantage of the NCRP Plan is the sense of ownership it 
would provide to Social Security participants who question the government’s 
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ability to meet future promises. The Plan, which I support, carefully balances the 
interests and preferences of individuals with the solvency of the Social Security 
system as a whole, and includes at its heart significant and vital protections for 
low-income Americans. I do have several concerns, however:
 The public needs to understand that, with a system of individual 
accounts, the individual will be subject to greater market risk. In a 
public defined-benefit system, the government manages market risk instead 
of the individual and has complete control over the distribution of benefits. 
Under the Commission’s proposal, individuals would take on part of that 
risk through their ISAs in exchange for greater involvement in the process. 
This tradeoff should be explained clearly to the public when changes to 
Social Security are being discussed. Moreover, if individual accounts do 
become part of Social Security, every effort needs to be made to ensure that 
a solid base level of defined benefits remains protected in the years to come.
 The public needs to understand the pros and cons of investing in 
individual accounts, especially with regard to equities. Although 
investors in the past decade have benefited from the phenomenal expansion 
of the market, the market’s recent volatility should remind us of this 
fundamental truth: We have no guarantee that the market will continue to 
deliver the returns of the past decade, or even the past 70 years. Under a 
system of ISAs, retirement savings will become partially contingent on the 
performance of the stock market; if the market drops, people investing in 
stocks will lose the money on which they would depend for retirement. 
Such losses would not be devastating for upper-income participants, and the 
Commission has worked diligently to preserve the benefits of lower-income 
individuals. But middle-income individuals—in our assumptions, 
participants earning roughly $28,000 a year—must be educated about the 
risk/reward tradeoffs of the stock market.
 We need to protect individuals from making speculative investments 
they cannot absorb. The Commission currently advocates a system that 
features four or five investment options, including stock index funds, a bond 
index fund, and a government securities fund. But the Plan goes on to 
envision the eventual introduction of an “increased number of investment 
options” along with the option of rolling over ISA money into similar, 
individually held private accounts. As the number of choices increases, 
adequate protections—such as diversification guidelines or rules for 
liquidity—must be in place, and administrative costs must be kept to a strict 
minimum. Otherwise, the temptation of speculative investment may lead 
participants to lose the money on which they would rely for their retirement 
years.
 We need to help middle-income Americans to save more. The 
Commission acknowledged the importance of encouraging middle-class 
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Americans to save more and expressed interest in concrete proposals 
(including tax credits or government matching programs) to help us to 
accomplish this goal. The Commission’s Plan, however, limits itself to 
recommending that fully deductible IRAs be extended (like Roth IRAs) to 
couples that earn up to $160,000 and individuals that earn up to $110,000 
(from current levels of $50,000 and $30,000, respectively). Although 
simplification is a worthy goal, my concern is that this kind of initiative 
would favor the transfer of wealth from the public coffers to people who are 
well-off already (and who need little incentive to save) without offering any 
proposals to help the less affluent. I think it is important that this discussion 
be continued by Congress and by future commissions of this nature.
Robert C. Pozen
I believe the NCRP’s Plan is a thoughtful effort to better assure Americans’ 
retirement income adequacy into the twenty-first century. The proposal does so by 
focusing on all three elements of retirement income—Social Security, employer-
sponsored retirement programs, and individual retirement savings—instead of 
focusing on just one of them. I believe that retirement income adequacy will be 
achieved only when all three elements of retirement savings are in a proper 
balance. The Commission’s Plan would go a long way toward providing such 
balance.
The Plan is not without its flaws, however. Specifically, I am concerned about 
the approach it takes with regard to personal accounts. Although I appreciate the 
administrative issues, I believe the Plan strips away much of what would make 
such personal accounts attractive—features like broad investment choice, 
immediacy of investment of payroll contributions, the ability to change 
investments frequently, and, perhaps most important, the assurance that significant 
educational efforts are being made to inform participants about investing the 
money in their personal accounts.
I therefore believe it would be a mistake to rely solely on a government-run 
personal account program; such a program would have to be built from scratch. I 
estimate it would take at least three years to build such a program and that it 
ultimately would require as many as 100,000 new government employees to 
operate it. Therefore, I believe the program would be considerably more flexible if 
we also took advantage of existing programs—such as participant-directed 401(k) 
plans and individual retirement accounts—as a vehicle for the personal accounts.
To be more specific, I would enable participants who so desire to opt out of the 
government-run personal account based on the TSP model and into a private 
market personal account. I assume this account would be limited to 2 percent of 
the participant’s Social Security contribution, as does the Commission’s proposal. 
To simplify the administration of such private market personal accounts, such an 
opt-out would be limited to the following already existing types of retirement 
accounts:
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 A participant-directed 401(k) plan that met the requirements of ERISA 
§404(c), but only if the employer sponsoring such a plan permitted the 
private market personal accounts to be maintained under that 401(k) plan; or
 A Social Security IRA (SIRA), but only if the financial institution 
sponsoring the SIRA agreed to maintain it in accordance with ERISA 
§404(c), as explained below.
In the case of the 401(k) plan, the employer simply would contribute the 2 
percent incrementally to the plan instead of forwarding it to the Department of the 
Treasury. This could be done on the same time schedule as the 401(k) plan, for 
example—monthly or quarterly. In the case of the SIRA alternative, the employer 
would continue to forward the 2 percent to the Department of the Treasury, but a 
participant who opted out of the Federal Thrift Plan model would obtain a tax 
credit of equal amount in order to avoid overpayment of Social Security taxes. The 
participant would qualify for the tax credit by making one annual contribution to 
an SIRA at a financial institution and would use the tax credit either to reduce 
withholding taxes or to obtain a tax refund. Under either option, the employer 
therefore would take on little or no additional administrative responsibility.
Such an opt-out would allow participants to choose among a broader range of 
investment alternatives than permitted under the Federal Thrift Plan model while 
still subjecting those accounts to the safeguards of Department of Labor 
regulations under ERISA §404(c). Under those regulations, a plan must offer at 
least three diversified “core” options, each of which has materially different risk 
and return characteristics. These core options would be similar to the three options 
under the Federal Thrift Plan. A 404(c) plan also could offer additional investment 
options; most 404(c) plans offer between 10 and 12 investment options, including 
the 3 core options. Any financial institution sponsoring an SIRA would be required 
to distribute an educational brochure about those options to participants designed 
to enable them to make intelligent investment decisions.
The flaw in the proposal regarding the personal accounts does not negate the 
power of the proposal in its attempt to balance the three elements of the retirement 
savings system properly. The personal account provision, however, in many ways 
is the cornerstone of the NCRP Plan—the link between provisions relating to 
Social Security on the one hand and the employer-sponsored retirement and 
individual retirement savings proposal on the other. I therefore believe Congress 
should spend more time in considering the administrative and investment issues 
involved with personal accounts as well as the significant potential benefits offered 
by private-sector accounts.
Dallas Salisbury
The Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) is a nonpartisan, nonlobbying 
organization. As a result, I normally do not agree to serve on groups like the 
NCRP. What attracted me was the chairmen’s insistence that, to be worthwhile, we 
had to reach a consensus or we might as well go home. They made the point that 
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Congress either acts or punts, and that we should do the same. As a result, we were 
able to recommend a package, even though many individual elements would not 
have been approved on a stand-alone basis. In addition, because we did not have 
the resources that Congress does, some of the recommendations could use further 
analysis. The most significant:
 Spousal treatment. The NCRP Plan would reduce the value of Social 
Security spousal benefits from 50 percent of the primary earner’s benefit to 
33 percent. This is a major change that could use detailed analysis to 
provide guidance on the appropriate phase-in period.
 Minimum benefit provision. By further reducing Social Security’s link 
between earnings records and program benefits, this reform could be 
expected to place a disincentive on work effort—especially for marginal 
workers, those at the threshold between earning the minimum benefit and 
the benefits provided for the rest of the population. This is a major departure 
from current law, on which we did not undertake analysis of behavioral 
consequences. The same is true for changes in the benefit formulas: AIME 
and PIA.
 Raising the retirement ages. The Commission’s recommendation to raise 
the early retirement age to 65 and the normal retirement age to 70 
recognizes improvements in life expectancy, but we did not analyze fully 
the implications for workers in physically demanding jobs, the integration 
with disability insurance, or employer plan retirement age policies of public 
and private employers.
 Implementing individual accounts. Large and uncertain amounts of 
revenue and time would be involved in establishing computer systems, 
offices, and personnel to handle 15 times as many participants as the largest 
defined-contribution plan record keeper. Social Security covers 83.5 times 
as many people as the TSP. Social Security would hold at least 7.0 times the 
number of individual accounts currently held by active 401(k) participants 
and at least 4.0 times the number of all employment-based defined-
contribution accounts combined. With nearly 6 million employers still 
providing wage information to Social Security once per year on paper, the 
transition time should not be underestimated. Conservatively, any type of 
universal individual account program could take 10 years to put in place and 
require a staff of more than 100,000. Great care should be taken to do it 
right, and not to make too many promises to the people.
I thank the Commission and its staff for providing me with this unique 
opportunity.
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Josephine “Josie” Tsao
The Commission’s stated objective was to improve retirement savings by 
providing increased opportunities for saving, simplifying the rules governing 
retirement plans, improving pension portability, and modernizing pension 
provisions to reflect changes in the workforce. We made a number of important 
recommendations to achieve this objective. I believe more needs to be done, 
however, to meet these goals. In particular, Congress should consider additional 
ways in which to make defined-benefit plans a more attractive component of 
retirement savings. One way could be by giving employers additional flexibility to 
coordinate their defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans and offer 
employees choices that maximize the best features of both arrangements. Two 
specific proposals would assist in achieving these goals:
1. Allow employers with excess defined-benefit plan assets to use assets in 
excess of a determined percentage of current liabilities to fund their 
contributions to their defined-contribution plans. The excess assets could 
be used only to fund employer contributions made on behalf of employees who 
also participated in the defined-benefit plan. This change would encourage 
employers to fund their defined-benefit plans aggressively and keep them from 
becoming inhibited from using conservative funding assumptions because they 
would know that, if they got into a situation in which there were more than 
enough assets than needed to meet all future benefit obligations, they could use 
those assets to fund other retirement savings plans. Congress recognized that 
the inability to use excess assets for other purposes represented a significant 
disincentive to employers’ willingness to offer defined-benefit plans when it 
allowed certain excess assets to be used to fund retiree health obligations. 
Although this is a beneficial provision, it is limited to those employers that 
offer retiree health benefits and have a number of conditions attached. 
Employers should be allowed to use these assets to make contributions to 
retirement savings plans that offer features valued by employees, including 
portability and control over investment decisions.
2. Allow employers to offer their employees the opportunity to transfer the 
value of their accrued benefit in a defined-benefit pension plan into the 
employers’ defined-contribution plans. If the employee chose to make this 
transfer, the optional forms of benefits provided by the defined-benefit plan 
would not have to be maintained in the defined-contribution plan. Such 
transfers would facilitate the concept of “partial retirement.” By transferring 
the value of their accrued benefit from a defined-benefit plan to a defined-
contribution plan, older workers who were eligible for retirement but wished to 
continue part-time employment would be able to withdraw amounts from the 
defined-contribution plan while continuing to work. Conversely, participants 
also could transfer their defined-contribution plan account balances into the 
employer’s defined-benefit plan. This proposal would allow employees to 
choose the form of retirement savings that met their objectives. If they wanted 
investment control, portability, and the opportunity to make in-service 
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withdrawals, they could move into the defined-contribution plan. If they 
preferred a guaranteed benefit, payable as an annuity and insured by the 
government, the defined-benefit plan would be more attractive. The 
government should encourage—not restrict—this type of flexibility. Finally, 
the Plan is consistent with current policy initiatives that would ease restrictions 
on removing optional forms of benefits, improve pension portability, and allow 
self-direction of investments within cash balance plans.
These two changes would encourage employers to offer plans with both 
defined-benefit and defined-contribution plan features and to fund them 
generously. It would give employees access to both types of plans and the 
flexibility to choose the mix that best met their needs. Truly, a retirement system 
for the twenty-first century.
David M. Walker
I, along with every other member of the NCRP, voted in favor of adopting this 
Plan. This is a minor miracle in light of the diversity of the Commission members, 
the complexity of this subject, and the emotions that can be associated with it. The 
unanimous vote is a tribute as well to the work of the staff of the Commission 
members and CSIS.
Although I have concerns regarding some of the individual recommendations 
contained in this report and am disappointed at the failure to incorporate certain 
other recommendations herein, I believe that the recommendations, when viewed 
as a package, represent a significant improvement over the status quo. At the same 
time, I believe that the following personal comments are appropriate.
Any comprehensive reform of the Social Security system should be designed 
to maintain a sound, certain, secure, and sustainable base level of defined benefit 
that is protected against inflation and targeted to provide greater replacement rates 
for lower- and lower middle–income workers. Any ISA element should come in 
addition to, instead of in lieu of, the base level of defined benefit. Reforms should 
be designed to have little or no impact on current and near-term retirees. In 
addition, any significant reform elements should be phased in over reasonable 
transition periods in order to assure fairness (that is, time for individuals to adjust) 
and feasibility (that is, implementation of any ISA element).
With regard to possible omissions from the report, I believe that additional 
emphasis should be placed on expanding employer and other collective pension 
and retirement savings arrangements, revising minimum participation standards in 
light of the changing workforce, enhancing women’s pension equity and security, 
and preserving retirement savings, including IRA savings, for retirement income 
purposes.
Finally, real retirement security requires that individuals have an adequate 
stream of income throughout their retirement years and access to affordable 
healthcare. As a result, even though this Commission focused on retirement 
income security issues, ultimately, it will become necessary for employers and 
policymakers to focus on a range of other health care and employment issues in 
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order to assure that individuals have a reasonable standard of living in their 
retirement years. In addition, employers, government, and other parties need to do 
more to help individuals to help themselves to plan, save, and invest for retirement.
